Stockholm, 8 January 2024
Check against delivery.
Your Majesty,
Your Royal Highnesses,
Soldiers and seamen,
Ladies and gentlemen,
I am delighted to be here again – at Sweden’s most important conference on national and international security issues. At a time when more and more are beginning to understand just how important these issues are.
Because Sweden faces a new and more dangerous reality. The free world and rules-based world order are being challenged by authoritarian forces in pursuit of an order where ‘might is right’.
Sweden and its neighbours are living in the direct shadow of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. But Russia’s threats, disinformation and cyber attacks are an attempt to destabilise the whole of Europe.
This leads me to a few key conclusions.
Firstly, persistence is essential in Sweden’s, the EU’s and the US’s support to Ukraine. Continued US support requires strong European support. Criticism of insufficient US engagement rings false if we do not stand up for our own continent.
Or, as Per Wästberg said in his latest book, which I read over the holidays:
“Our destiny is playing out in Ukraine – the struggle to remain who we are and dare to believe in ourselves. Ukraine is facing an existential threat – this is a threat that we share.”
On Zelenskyy, he concludes, “It is our security he is defending.”
Secondly, Sweden’s natural place is in NATO.
This is a conviction that many of us here have held for decades. And there is now broad political consensus on this major paradigm shift. In the face of acute threats we are still able to come together. I believe we must do so more often.
Sweden has unique military capabilities – in the air and under sea, with our intelligence capacity and winter-ready soldiers. We can shoulder a greater responsibility in the Baltic Sea region and within NATO command structures. And we know the maritime conditions in this area that will now be enclosed by NATO Allies – with its brackish waters, low mean depth, varying topography and short distances.
We connect the Baltic region to the transatlantic link. And we have a key role to play in the deployment and transport of Allied combat forces, enabling NATO to operate in our part of Europe.
We will contribute to NATO’s deterrence and defence.
Last year, I announced that Sweden was – in addition to contributing to NATO’s Baltic Air Policing and cooperation to boost European air defence – ready to provide ground combat units to the defence of the Baltic countries. Today, I can report that the Government intends to contribute a reduced battalion to the Canadian-led forces in Latvia.
But Sweden also offers all its other strengths: a strong economy, an advanced defence industry and our Swedish values. Joining the free world’s defence alliance is something new – but it is still a homecoming.
We waste no time awaiting the final ratifications. Because, thirdly, Sweden is arming itself – swiftly and forcefully.
This year, we are investing an additional SEK 27 billion in military defence and will reach the NATO spending target of two per cent of GDP. Defence expenditure will have doubled between 2020 and 2024 – and with greater resources comes a greater responsibility to use them effectively. Defending Sweden in war is our defining task.
In December, Minister for Defence Pål Jonson signed a historic defence cooperation agreement with the United States. In the past, Sweden’s defence cooperation with the US was secretive – as Staffan Carlsson brilliantly described in his new book on Dag Hammarskjöld. Today, we are transparent and have identified 17 military facilities where we are making preparations to be able to receive military support.
Fourthly, Sweden’s build-up must take place on a broad scale.
The military, civil and high-tech components must form a single whole. Our opponents seek to exploit any and all vulnerabilities of our open society. This threat must be taken seriously.
Internal and external security go hand in hand. In every speech at Society and Defence since 2018, I have called for a Swedish national security council that takes an overarching approach to addressing major security issues – from the campaign against Swedish social services, to gang crime and support to Ukraine.
The operational work is being led by National Security Adviser Henrik Landerholm, who remains in contact with his European, American and other international counterparts.
Sweden now has a better overall capacity to analyse and coordinate vital Swedish security interests. As you are aware, Sweden has a tendency to compartmentalise. But nothing is less suitable for compartmentalisation and ministerial turf battles than national security issues.
For the first time since the end of the Second World War, the Government has also appointed a specific Minister for Civil Defence. Carl-Oskar Bohlin’s mandate is to ensure society’s robustness during times of heightened alert or war. Experience from Ukraine has shown that resilience must be built from the ground up. When President Zelenskyy visited Harpsund, the CV90, Archer and JAS 39 Gripen were obviously high on the agenda. But so too were energy production and the people’s will to defend themselves.
And when I visited the Kyiv School of Economics, wi-fi in shelters was a central theme – in terms of both instruction and defence. Step by step, we are now building up the new total defence. On 19 January, Sweden will reactivate the civilian service.
Ukraine has taught us that a country’s most important resource in war is the people’s common will to defend themselves. We, too, must begin to discuss the expectations that come with Swedish citizenship. Ultimately, it is about defending Sweden, our values and our way of life – with weapons in hand and our lives on the line. Citizenship is not a travel document.
Finally, my mandate and that of my Government is to prioritise, provide resources and make decisions. But ultimately it is we citizens – all of us – who build a more secure Sweden.
Many people serve every day in the Swedish defence – as civilians and as military, as conscripts and professional soldiers. During my first year as Prime Minister, I have seen what you are capable of. From the conscripts in my own daughters’ platoons in Skövde and Enköping, to seamen on the submarine Gotland in Karlskrona and combat vehicle personnel in Boden, to the Swedish special forces units in Karlsborg. I am proud of your work.
Yours is no ordinary job. You are defending our country’s freedom. We are defending our country’s freedom.
Thank you.
Source – Swedish Government
The future of Sweden’s security policy – speech by Minister for Foreign Affairs Tobias Billström at the Folk och Försvar Annual National Conference
Stockholm, 8 January 2024
Speech by Minister for Foreign Affairs Tobias Billström at the Folk och Försvar (Society and Defence) Annual National Conference in Sälen, Sunday 7 January.
Check against delivery.
Your Majesty,
Your Royal Highnesses,
Soldiers and seamen,
Ladies and gentlemen,
It is an honour to speak here at the Folk och Försvar Annual National Conference. And it feels particularly fitting to speak about the future of Sweden’s security policy as we so clearly find ourselves in a time of historic upheaval.
Everyone in this room is aware of the major geopolitical challenges we are facing: Russia’s illegal attack on Ukraine and on Europe’s security. The war between Israel and Hamas. Tensions in East Asia. The use of economies and technologies as weapons.
Today, I would like to speak about how Sweden is navigating in these times of upheaval. Because in this formative stage, Sweden must be actively involved in shaping the future security of our neighbourhood and of Europe.
The most important expression of us taking on this responsibility is Sweden’s forthcoming membership of NATO. Membership of NATO will entail the biggest change in Swedish security policy in more than 200 years. And it will fundamentally redraw the security policy map in our part of Europe.
It will imply both great responsibilities and new opportunities to strengthen our freedom and security – not least for Swedish diplomacy.
Allow me to highlight a few aspects of this work.
Firstly: Our central starting point is that Russia will constitute a serious threat to the security of Sweden and Europe for the foreseeable future.
We must be realistic and assume – and be prepared for – a drawn-out confrontation that will continue for as long as Russia flagrantly breaches the UN Charter and the European security order.
International law is a cornerstone of Swedish and transatlantic security.
Our opportunities to influence domestic developments in Russia are very limited, but change may come quickly and without warning.
It is in Sweden’s interests to limit Russia’s strategic scope for action – militarily, economically and politically. And to invest in our own strength and cohesion. These are the guiding lights in Sweden’s policy within the EU and NATO.
Secondly: Our military, political and economic support to Ukraine will – as the Prime Minister said in the Statement of Government Policy – be the main task of foreign policy in the years ahead. Ukraine’s soldiers are also fighting for our security and our values.
Strong, predictable and sustained support to Ukraine is also our primary opportunity to restrict Russia’s scope for action. Sweden is a driving force within the EU for harsher sanctions and for restricting Russia’s possibilities to fund its war of aggression.
We warmly welcome the EU’s decision to open accession negotiations with Ukraine. This is a historic decision, and one that we worked hard to pave the way for, not least during our Presidency of the Council. EU enlargement is a geostrategic investment in peace, security, stability and prosperity.
Thirdly: Our guiding principle will be a solidarity-based alliance policy, aiming to enhance security and stability in our neighbourhood and the Euro-Atlantic area as a whole.
The cohesion and credibility in Article 5 are the foundation of NATO – politically as well as militarily. Safeguarding this cohesion means safeguarding the Alliance’s strength.
This is a core Swedish interest. Sweden will be a reliable, loyal and engaged NATO member. We support NATO’s 360-degree approach.
Fourthly: We will fully harness the opportunities associated with Sweden’s and Finland’s NATO accession in terms of strengthening security and stability in Northern Europe.
The key contribution that Sweden can make to defence in our part of Europe will be of fundamental benefit to the Alliance as a whole. Our geographical location and our military resources give us unique opportunities to contribute in a way that raises the threshold and enhances stability.
It is a matter of facilitating joint defence planning and NATO’s possibilities to act collectively in Northern Europe. This too is an integral part of a policy that aims to limit Russia’s possibilities to cause harm.
Fifthly: We will use Sweden’s seat and voice in NATO to increase our influence on a range of security policy issues.
One of my first decisions as Minister for Foreign Affairs was a reorganisation of the Ministry, one aim of which was to increase coordination on security policy issues. This is necessary in order to meet the demands now placed on us.
NATO enjoys political and military integration of unique depth. To have an impact, we must seamlessly combine political and military aspects in a range of areas into a coherent policy.
This is particularly relevant for NATO’s three core tasks: deterrence and defence, crisis prevention and management, and cooperative security.
It includes challenges related to regions such as the Indo-Pacific region, the southern neighbourhood and the Arctic.
It includes issues such as terrorism, disinformation and protection of critical infrastructure.
And it includes action on new and emerging threats, with an emphasis on technology and telecommunications, innovation and space issues and the ever-closer links between economies and security.
At the same time, we must continue to strengthen the EU as a strategic actor. Contributing in a spirit of solidarity to the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy and its broad toolbox is a natural cornerstone of Sweden’s future security policy.
Europe needs a strong EU, and NATO needs a stronger European pillar.
Sixthly: US engagement is indispensable for Sweden’s and Europe’s security, and must never be taken for granted. The bilateral defence cooperation agreement is of strategic importance and is a milestone in relations between our countries.
The agreement enables us to receive rapid and early US military support if our situation should deteriorate. We have designed the agreement to strengthen security for us, for the United States and for our neighbours. It is a deterrent and stabilising agreement.
The fact that our Nordic neighbours have similar agreements is an important expression of the security and defence policy consensus in the Nordic region.
Seventhly: As the strategic landscape in Northern Europe changes, foreign and security policy cooperation in the region can develop hand in hand with the closer defence policy cooperation I just mentioned.
The need is clear in light of the deteriorating security situation. And Finland’s NATO membership and Sweden’s imminent membership offer a historic opportunity. For the first time ever, all of the democratic neighbours in our region are choosing the same security policy arrangements.
This year, Sweden is presiding over the Nordic Council of Ministers and coordinating the informal cooperation between the Nordic-Baltic countries (N5 and NB8, respectively). Deepening security policy cooperation in our neighbourhood is one of our priorities, along with continued support to Ukraine and increased pressure on Russia.
All of what I have described is interlinked – our membership of and role in the EU and NATO, the defence cooperation agreement with the United States, support to Ukraine, Russia policy, and deepened cooperation between the Nordic-Baltic countries. These building blocks of our future security policy are individually important, but together they form an even more important whole.
As I said at the beginning, the conditions of Swedish security policy have fundamentally changed. Prioritising these issues is no longer a choice: it is an absolute necessity.
In this new landscape, and with the solidarity-based alliance policy as our guiding light, we are shaping Sweden’s security policy future within the framework of our means and together with our partners. It is a future in which we are part of a strong region, firmly anchored in the EU and in NATO. This is how we make Sweden more secure.