Brussels, 27 September 2024
By Jens Stoltenberg
As I approach the end of my tenure as NATO Secretary General, I look back at some of the important lessons of the past 10 years that I believe must continue to guide the Alliance in the future.
The world has changed profoundly since 2014 when I took up my post as NATO Secretary General. Putin has brought brutal war back to Europe, global competition has accelerated, and many challenges – from terrorism to disruptive technologies and from cyber-attacks to climate change – have transformed our security landscape and our everyday lives. As the world has changed, so has NATO.
This past decade has undoubtedly been the most transformational one for the Alliance since the Cold War. We have strengthened our defences by putting tens of thousands of combat-ready NATO soldiers on our Eastern flank for the first time in our history. We now have half a million troops on high readiness across the Alliance, backed by substantial naval and air power. We are ramping up the production of military capabilities and building closer ties between our defence industries across Europe and North America. Allies have significantly increased their investments in defence. The number of Allies spending at least 2% of their GDP on defence has gone from three in 2014 to 23 in 2024. We do all this not to provoke war, but to prevent war and preserve peace. That is NATO’s core mission. NATO has not only become stronger, it has also grown larger. Four countries – Montenegro, North Macedonia, Finland and Sweden – joined our family, and Ukraine is closer than ever to NATO, where it rightfully belongs. We have also deepened our partnerships with countries in the Indo-Pacific region, expanded our partnerships in our Southern neighbourhood, and brought our cooperation with the European Union to unprecedented levels.
In 10 years, NATO has also become more agile and ready to tackle challenges from wherever they might come. We declared cyber and space new domains of operation, alongside land, sea and air. We are strengthening the resilience of our societies and critical infrastructure, striving to eliminate harmful dependencies on authoritarian regimes. We now have a greater focus on innovation and deep tech, with NATO’s new Defence Innovation Accelerator (DIANA) and our billion-euro NATO Investment Fund. The challenges posed by China’s coercive policies and the security impacts of climate change are now firmly on NATO’s agenda. These changes have been crucial, and NATO will continue to adapt. After a decade at the helm of the Alliance, I would like to offer five lessons that are key to NATO’s continued success. The first lesson is that our security does not come for free. We have to be willing to pay the price for peace. After the Cold War, when tensions went down, so did our defence spending. When our security is at stake, as it is today, it is clear that our defence budgets need to go up. The more we spend, the stronger our defences, the more effective our deterrence, and the greater our security. The good news is that since 2014, when Allies agreed to move towards spending 2% of their GDP on defence, investments in defence have gone up substantially. For the first time, collective defence spending in Canada and Europe has gone above 2%. The bad news, however, is that 2% benchmark is no longer enough. At the NATO Summit in 2023, Allies approved robust, new defence plans for the security of Europe. These plans come with specific capability targets, including weapons, forces and readiness levels that individual Allies need to provide. To meet these targets and ensure that we can execute these plans, if needed, Allies will need to spend significantly more than 2% on defence going forward.
The second lesson is that freedom is more valuable than free trade. Our economic choices have security consequences. Until recently, some Allies believed that buying gas from Russia was a purely commercial matter. However, we have seen that relying on gas from Russia made us vulnerable. We must not make the same mistake with China. We need to better protect our critical infrastructure, avoid exporting technologies that can be used against us, and reduce our dependence on critical materials from strategic competitors. This is crucial for our security. This does not mean Allies should build barriers amongst themselves. Protectionism between Allies is not good for our security, or for our economies. On the contrary, in line with Article 2 of our founding North Atlantic Treaty, Allies must work together to enhance economic collaboration. The third lesson is that military strength is a prerequisite for dialogue. This is clearly demonstrated in Ukraine. I do not believe we can change President Putin’s mind about a free and independent Ukraine, but I do think we can change his calculus. By giving Ukraine more weapons, we can make the regime in Moscow understand that it cannot win on the battlefield and that the only option for Russia is to come to the negotiating table. Although paradoxical, the shortest path to peace and dialogue in Ukraine is through providing more weapons to Ukraine. Since Putin’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, there has been no basis for constructive dialogue with Russia. But as President Zelenskyy himself has made clear, Russia will need to be part of any peace deal. It is for Ukraine to decide when the time is right for talks, but it is clear that power is the only language Putin understands. Dialogue only works when it is backed by strong defences.
The fourth lesson is that military power has its limits. Afghanistan is a case in point. Following the terrorist attacks against the United States on 9/11, it was right to send NATO forces into Afghanistan. Our military intervention helped degrade al-Qaeda and prevent Afghanistan from being a safe haven for international terrorists to attack our countries. We achieved our original objectives, but we also saw the cost of mission creep. Building a democratic and united Afghanistan with equal rights for all was a worthy goal, but it was too ambitious. What started as a focused counter-terrorism operation became a large-scale nation building exercise. However, after 20 years, the Taliban were gaining ground and the international community had failed to build a stable Afghan government that could keep their own country safe after we left. The fact that the Afghan government and the security forces collapsed so quickly demonstrated why it was right to leave. There was no evidence that staying for another 20 years would have changed the outcome. We may be called upon again to intervene militarily beyond our borders in the future. However, any future operation must have clearly defined objectives throughout the operation. We must be clear about what NATO’s military might can – and cannot achieve.
The fifth and final lesson is that we should never take the bond between Europe and North America for granted. On both sides of the Atlantic, we must recognise the value of the transatlantic alliance and invest in it. Europeans must understand that without NATO, there is no security in Europe. 80% of NATO’s defence expenditure comes from Allies that are not members of the European Union. These Allies contribute significant resources, but they are also strategically positioned to secure the European continent, from Türkiye in the south and Norway in the north to the US, Canada and the UK in the west. For their part, Americans must recognise the value of their friends and allies in NATO. From Korea to Afghanistan, America has never had to fight alone. Thirty-one countries make substantial contributions to US security and interests. They multiply America’s power and influence globally. This is an advantage that no other major global power has. NATO is one of America’s greatest assets.
In a more dangerous and interconnected world, the security challenges we face are too big and competition too fierce for any NATO country to do it alone. I do not believe in Europe alone and I do not believe in America alone. I believe in Europe and America together in a strong NATO. Investing in the transatlantic relationship is the only winning way forward for our peace and security – now and for generations to come.
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What is published in NATO Review does not constitute the official position or policy of NATO or member governments. NATO Review seeks to inform and promote debate on security issues. The views expressed by authors are their own.
About the Author
Jens Stoltenberg has been NATO Secretary General since 1 October 2014 and will complete his term in office on 1 October 2024.
Source – NATO Review