Brussels, 28 March 2025
Ukraine’s energy system has endured relentless and brutal attacks by Russia. Yet, through incredible skill and resourcefulness, Ukraine has managed to keep the lights on through the winter. Now the unpredictable Trump administration has begun haphazardly withdrawing air defences and intelligence while using nuclear power stations as bargaining chips. More than ever, Ukraine needs support to transition towards a long-term energy system that is resilient, flexible and secure. The EU has the expertise, the ability and the will to help make that happen.
Learning from Ukraine
Ukraine’s energy systems have suffered significant damage since the full-scale invasion of 2022. As of spring 2024, two thirds of the country’s dispatchable power generation capacity has fallen under occupation, been damaged or destroyed. This has been accompanied by a coordinated destruction of the grid network.
Ukraine’s thermal power stations – primarily coal-fired – have borne the brunt of the attacks. Despite heroic efforts to maintain operations, as of September 2024, the country had lost 80% of its thermal capacity due to Russian attacks. Its large nuclear energy sector, which contributes 55% of total generation, has been less affected. Russia’s reluctance to directly strike nuclear power stations has meant that apart from the occupied Zaporizhzhia plant, Ukraine’s nuclear generation has largely remained operational, albeit at reduced capacity. However, efforts by President Trump to take over the running of these plants could jeopardise their continued role in Ukraine’s energy system.
As of September 2024, the country had lost 80% of its thermal capacity due to Russian attacks
Ukraine did have some pre-war structural strengths that have helped its resilience. In particular, it had an especially strong transmission system designed to carry roughly 56 GW of electricity, even though the country’s generation capacity was closer to 25 GW. While the transmission system has also suffered damage, the built-in flexibility of its capacity has proven to be a vital source of resilience. Likewise, the tireless work of Ukrainian engineers in repairing and maintaining the grid cannot be overstated.
Ukraine’s renewables sector has also shown considerable resilience, despite the seizure of key assets by Russian forces. Renewable energy sources (RES) continue to supply 8.7% of Ukraine’s energy, down from 9.4% in 2021. However, this decline is largely due to the occupation of territory rather than the destruction of infrastructure. Over 40% of Ukraine’s pre-2022 RES in solar PV and wind power currently lies in occupied territory. Wind generation capacity, once concentrated in the now occupied regions of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia, has been especially hard hit. The Russian destruction of the Kakhovka dam has also significantly reduced Ukraine’s hydroelectric generation capacity.
All in all, Ukraine’s experience demonstrates the immense challenge of ensuring a reliable energy supply in wartime.
The biggest problem is fixed, high-value infrastructure. The crippling of Ukraine’s thermal capacity – illustrated by the destruction of the Kurakhivska thermal power plant – demonstrates just how exposed these critical assets are to targeted attacks. Even with sophisticated air defences, an overwhelming swarm of drones and/or missiles can inflict irreparable damage with long-term consequences. Repair efforts can only accomplish so much, with roughly only 5 GW of over 25 GW of lost generation capacity restored in two years.
Ukraine’s experience demonstrates the immense challenge of ensuring a reliable energy supply in wartime
The same goes for the grid. Ukraine’s extensive transmission infrastructure has suffered severe damage in the war, with capacity falling from 56 GW to an estimated 9 GW by the end of 2024. Transformer stations that connect the transmission grid to power stations and the distribution grid are also high-value targets which are hard to replace or repair, especially at speed.
The already acute vulnerability of such fixed assets will only be exacerbated in the absence of effective air defences.
Building resilience through a decentralised electricity network
A decentralised energy network – built around multiple small, localised generation nodes linked together through a meshed grid – offers extensive resilience against Russian attacks. Why?
The first reason is attrition. By bringing generation down to a single solar panel or wind turbine, it flips the cost calculation of mass drone or missile attacks on its head. While it might make sense to launch a swarm of Shahed-136 drones at $20,000 a piece against a multi-million dollar energy facility, it makes little strategic or economic sense against a $100 solar panel or even a $2000 wind turbine.
Adecentralised energy network offers extensive resilience against Russian attacks
The second is flexibility. A large power station or high-voltage grid system requires specialised equipment and months to relocate or rebuild. A collection of solar modules with a battery can be loaded into the back of a van and redeployed within minutes. Portable gas turbines are moveable but with limited air defence and required gas supply, they are slightly less agile even while offering continuous electricity supply.
The third is speed. Solar power is the quickest and cheapest way to deploy electricity generation. In the face of sudden attacks, solar can quickly fill some gaps in the electricity system. Especially when combined with battery storage, it offers a rapid and reliable source of electricity, albeit in lower volumes.
While the individual generation capacity of solar modules and individual turbines is low, if bonded together using Ukraine’s extensive distribution grid they become even more resilient. In grids, there is resilience in numbers.
Notes for the EU
A decentralised energy generation system is highly resilient and capable of guaranteeing sustained energy security. Solar generation in particular is agile, portable, rapidly scalable and extremely cheap. When combined with battery technology it becomes a powerful complement to a struggling energy system. Supported by a resilient grid, it can provide not only not only short-term energy security in the face of relentless Russian attacks but also lay the foundations for a long-term, robust energy system. Crucially, it will also remove external leverage – whether from Putin or the Trump administration – over Ukraine’s energy security.
The EU should apply the lessons from Ukraine to strengthen its own energy system
The EU can play a pivotal role by channelling financial support into the development of new RES systems, building on its own domestic experiences with decarbonisation. The EU can also provide expertise in managing grids powered by renewable energy, as already demonstrated by operators like 50 HERTZ.
Looking ahead, the EU should apply the lessons from Ukraine to strengthen its own energy system – building resilience and removing structural vulnerabilities. One critical area is in the power grid: while one interconnector is vulnerable, one hundred smaller connections are resilient.
In an era of growing geopolitical uncertainty, energy security is one thing that can still be actively safeguarded.
Source – EU-ISS