Fri. Feb 21st, 2025
President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy during a briefing for the media
President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy (r) during a press briefing. Source: President of Ukraine

Kyiv, 19 February 2025

Head of the Office of the President Andriy Yermak met with U.S. Special Envoy for Ukraine and Russia Keith Kellogg. This was the first meeting held by the Special Envoy during his visit to Ukraine, and the Ukrainian side highly appreciates this gesture of support at a difficult time for our country.

Andriy Yermak emphasized the importance of Keith Kellogg having full and objective information about the frontline developments and the Ukrainians’ ability and willingness to end the war with a just and lasting peace. In particular, the American side will be briefed directly by the military command and local commanders, which will help them assess the real situation on the battlefield.

Ukraine counts on continued support from the United States and is committed to maintaining open and trusting bilateral relations based on the principles of mutual respect and shared success.

The parties placed special emphasis on how the war should end, as this factor will be crucial not only for Ukraine but also for global security.

“No one wants to end this war more than Ukrainians. But to end it with a just and lasting peace,” the Head of the Presidential Office noted.

Andriy Yermak noted that Russia continues to use information manipulation and seeks to sow discord among our country’s partners. Therefore, it is important to adhere to the principle of “nothing about Ukraine without Ukraine,” which remains key in all international negotiations.

Our state is also interested in a comprehensive strategic partnership with the United States, which includes security guarantees, as well as expanded defense and economic cooperation. During the meeting, the parties discussed concrete steps necessary to strengthen partnership relations further.

The Head of the Presidential Office thanked Keith Kellogg for the constructive dialogue and substantive meeting, emphasizing the importance of joint efforts to achieve a just peace.

Source – President of Ukraine

 


We Are Open to Providing Keith Kellogg with All Necessary Information to Understand the Situation in Ukraine – President

Kyiv, 19 February 2025

Russia is spreading disinformation about the ratings of support for the government by Ukrainians, so it is important to publish and provide partners with the results of Ukrainian opinion polls. This was stated by President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy during a briefing for the media.

The President noted that U.S. Special Envoy for Ukraine and Russia Keith Kellogg, who is currently visiting Ukraine, will have access to trust ratings and the opportunity to speak with Ukrainians to better understand their views on the government, potential concessions to Russia, and whether they trust the Russian dictator.

“For me, it is essential that Mr. Kellogg receives this information firsthand – that he understands the situation for himself. Of course, there will be meetings with the military, intelligence briefings, and discussions with the Security Service of Ukraine. Whatever requests their side has made, whatever requests we have received – we are open to this,” the President stated.

The President also confirmed his readiness to visit the frontline together with General Kellogg to meet with the soldiers defending Ukraine from Russian aggression.

“Let’s go, and let him talk to the military there. Are the soldiers ready to vote urgently now in order to go home? In order to surrender everything to the Russians without any security guarantees? Let him ask the people who live and fight here. I think ordinary people have answers to all this,” the Head of State emphasized.

Source – President of Ukraine

 


U.S. Talks with Russian Representatives Helped Putin Break Out of Isolation – Volodymyr Zelenskyy

Kyiv, 19 February 2025

Negotiations between the United States and Russia have helped the Russian dictator end years of isolation, President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy stated during a press briefing in Kyiv.

The President believes these contacts are happening due to a lack of objective information within the new U.S. administration.

“I would like Trump’s team to have more access to the truth, because all of this is certainly not benefiting Ukraine. What it does is bring Putin out of isolation. And I think that Putin and the Russians are very pleased that issues are being discussed with them. Yesterday, we even saw signs of them being treated as victims. This is something new,” Volodymyr Zelenskyy remarked.

The President also pointed out that the meeting in Saudi Arabia did not address the issues that are most critical to Ukrainians, as reflected in all opinion polls.

“In Saudi Arabia, the foreign ministers of two states meet in the presence of a third foreign minister, yet they do not discuss the issue of POWs. And they certainly do not discuss missile strikes and bombardments,” Volodymyr Zelenskyy emphasized.

Instead, according to Volodymyr Zelenskyy, the U.S. and Russia focused on Russian disinformation regarding approval ratings. He announced that in the coming weeks, Ukraine will publish trust ratings for the President of Ukraine, the President of the United States, and other key partners to counter this.

Source – President of Ukraine

 


Dynamics of trust in President V. Zelenskyi in 2019-2024 – a December 2024 survey by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS)

From December 2 to 17, 2024, the  conducted its own all-Ukrainian public opinion survey “Omnibus”, to which, on its own initiative, added a question about trust in the President (in two different formulations).

By the method of telephone interviews (computer-assistedtelephoneinterviews, CATI) based on a random sample of mobile phone numbers (with random generation of phone numbers and subsequent statistical weighting) in all regions of Ukraine (the territory controlled by the Government of Ukraine), 2,000 respondents were interviewed (half of the respondents were asked the question in one wording, half in another wording).

The survey was conducted with adult (aged 18 and older) citizens of Ukraine who, at the time of the survey, lived in the territory of Ukraine controlled by the Government of Ukraine. The sample did not include residents of territories temporarily not controlled by the Ukrainian authorities (at the same time, some of the respondents are IDPs who moved from occupied territories), and the survey was not conducted with citizens who left abroad after February 24, 2022.

Formally, under normal circumstances, the statistical error of a sample of about 1,000 respondents (since half of the respondents answered each option of the trust question) (with a probability of 0.95 and taking into account the design effect of 1.3) did not exceed 4.1% for indicators close to 50%, 3.5% for indicators close to 25%, 2.5% for indicators close to 10%, 1.8% for indicators close to 5%.

Under the conditions of war, in addition to the specified formal error, a certain systematic deviation is added. Factors that may affect the quality of results in “wartime” conditions were previously cited by KIIS.

In general, we believe that the obtained results are still highly representative and allow a fairly reliable analysis of the public moods of the population.

KIIS regularly monitors attitudes towards various public institutions and subjects, in particular, towards the President of Ukraine. Attitude towards the President is not only an assessment of his activities as an official, but also, in a broader interpretation, is a marker of the domestic political situation (especially against the backdrop of a full-scale invasion).

At the same time, even in seemingly “simple” questions such as trust in the President, both the wording and the scale of possible answers (and other factors such as the survey method, the order of questions in the questionnaire, etc.) actually have a significant impact. That is why the media often shows quite different results regarding trust in the President, which can lead to misunderstandings and misinterpretation of public opinion.

In our own survey, which we conducted in December 2024, we conducted an experiment where half of the respondents were asked the question about trust in the President in one formulation, and the other half in another (split-sample). Below, we first present the dynamics of trust in the formulation that was regularly asked during the full-scale invasion. Next, we present the results of our other question, which we ask every year in December to assess the dynamics of trust in institutions.

Dynamics of trust in President V. Zelenskyi in 2019-2024 (questions when we do not immediately offer the respondent “hard to say” or another “intermediate” option between trust and distrust)

So, first we present the results for the question, which was as follows: “To what extent do you trust or distrust Volodymyr Zelenskyi?” The respondent could choose one of the options that were read out: “do not trust at all”, “rather do not trust”, “rather trust”, “completely trust”. The option “hard to say” was not read out, but respondents could ask to mark it on their own initiative (i.e. when the respondent himself answers the interviewer that he cannot choose from the 4 proposed options and it is difficult for him to decide).

The graph below shows the dynamics of trust in President V. Zelenskyi from 2019 to December 2024. It is worth focusing on the dynamics of trust during the year, that is, in the period from December 2023 to December 2024. At the end of 2023, 77% trusted the President, but by February 2024, trust decreased to 64%, and by May 2024, to 59% (at the same time, the share of those who do not trust increased from 22% to 36% during the specified period). By October 2024, the situation stabilized, but between October and December 2024, the level of trust began to decline again, although not so much due to those who do not trust, but to those who have an uncertain attitude towards the President (i.e., between October and December, uncertainty, not distrust, increased primarily).

As of December 2024, 52% of Ukrainians trusted President V. Zelenskyi, 39% did not trust him. The remaining 9% responded that they could not decide on their attitude. Although trust indicators have worsened over the year, the balance of trust-distrust remains positive: +13%.

Graph 1. Dynamics of trust in President V. Zelenskyi during 2019-2024 - "To what extent do you trust or distrust Volodymyr Zelenskyi?"
Graph 1. Dynamics of trust in President V. Zelenskyi during 2019-2024: “To what extent do you trust or distrust Volodymyr Zelenskyi?” 

In all regions of Ukraine[1] the situation is quite similar and the balance of trust-distrust is positive. The attitude towards the President is somewhat better in the West (balance of trust-distrust +27%) and in the Center (+13%). In the South and East, the trust indicators are also quite high, but slightly lower and the balance of trust-distrust in these regions is close to 0 (i.e., approximately the same proportion of people trust and do not trust). 

Graph 2. Trust in President V. Zelenskyi in the regional dimension
Graph 2. Trust in President V. Zelenskyi in the regional dimension 

Trust in the President is much more strongly linked not to the region of residence, but to the level of optimism. KIIS previously published the results of a survey on how optimistic Ukrainians are about the future and how they assess unity in society[2]. According to one classification, 50% of Ukrainians can be classified as consistent or rather consistent optimists, and 23% as consistent or rather consistent pessimists. The remaining 27% have conflicting or uncertain views on the future and unity of Ukrainians. Graph 3 shows how these categories of the population feel about President Volodymyr Zelenskyi.

Thus, among pessimists, 57% do not trust the President, while 31% do. Among those who have uncertain or conflicting views on the future of Ukraine, 42% trust him, compared to 49% who do not. In contrast, among optimists, 67% trust the President, while 26% do not trust him.

Graph 3. Trust in President V. Zelensky in terms of the level of optimism
Graph 3. Trust in President V. Zelensky in terms of the level of optimism 

At the same time, we call for caution in the interpretation of the causal relationship. On the one hand, it can be assumed that lower trust or disappointment in the President can lead a person to pessimistic assessments of the future. On the other hand, the effect can be the opposite – increasing pessimistic views on the future of the country can also lead to a more gloomy view of the activities of the authorities. It cannot be ruled out that there is another third factor that simultaneously affects both trust in the authorities and the level of optimism (for example, successes or lack thereof on the battlefield). However, in any case, the connection is obvious and important for the correct interpretation of public moods in the country.

Trust in the President, if immediately read and offer the option “hard to say” among the options

As noted, the sample of our research was divided into two halves (into two representative subsamples). So far, we have talked about the results of the survey of the first half of the sample. The question was read to the second half of the respondents as follows: “Now I will name some social institutions and public figures. Please tell me how much you trust those whom I will name.” The respondent was immediately offered the following options: “completely trust”, “rather trust”, “hard to say”, “rather do not trust”, “completely do not trust”. That is, the respondent immediately heard and knew that he could choose “hard to say” among the possible options. Below is the dynamics of trust in the President according to the question with this wording in 2021-2024.

As shown above, when we read out the “hard to say” option, the proportion of those who choose it increases to 24% (compared to 9%). At the same time, the proportion of those who trust and those who do not trust decreases. So, in this case, the level of trust is 45%, and distrust is 31%.

It is important that regardless of the wording of the question, we see similar trends over the past year, as well as a similar situation at the moment. Thus, in the first wording, the balance of trust-distrust was +13%, in the second wording (see the graph below) – +14%. That is, in terms of the trust / distrust ratio, the situation is very close and in both cases shows a predominance of those who trust.

At the same time, in both cases we see a decline in trust over the past year, and even to a roughly similar extent. So, in the case of the first formulation, 52% now trust, in December 2023 77% trusted, so the current indicator is 68% of the 2023 indicator (or in other words, the current indicator is a third lower than it was a year ago). In the case of the second formulation (which we consider in this paragraph), the current indicator is 73% of the 2023 indicator (or more than a quarter lower). Now the order of decline is quite close regardless of how we formulate the question).

However, these two formulations enrich the understanding of the state of trust in the President. Yes, now there are still more people who trust him than do not, although the trend is indeed downward. At the same time, there is a quarter of citizens whose trust is “on the borderline”, since they trust in some things and not in others (an illustrative example is approval of activities in the international arena along with criticism of domestic actions). Therefore, these citizens are very hesitant and context-dependent (i.e., they depend on specific events that are discussed in the media during the survey).

Graph 4. Dynamics of trust in President V. Zelenskyi during 2021-2024 (when the respondent is also offered the option “hard to say”)
Graph 4. Dynamics of trust in President V. Zelenskyi during 2021-2024 (when the respondent is also offered the option “hard to say”)
A. Hrushetskyi, comments on the survey results:

“In the issue of trust in the President, we as sociologists see a “temptation” on the part of a number of public figures to resort to merciless and uncompromising criticism (especially from those who either “feel” the election approaching (even if this is objectively not the case), as well as from individual public activists or journalists who are more concerned with their “niche” than with the desire for the country’s progress).

For our part, we remind you that in the conditions of a full-scale war, the President is not only “one of the politicians” operating in the country, but also the personification of a critically important public institution. The weakening of trust in V. Zelenskyi indeed reduces his future potential and weight as a public figure, but also deals critical blows to the institution of the President, which may lead to a loss of controllability. It is hardly worth explaining further what disasters can happen in the event of delegitimization and collapse of the controllability of the institution of the President and the government in general. However, unfortunately, a number of public figures in Ukraine demonstrate supposedly patriotic behavior, but behind which the formula “my hatred for V. Zelenskyi is higher than my love for Ukraine” is clearly visible to the naked eye.

Our survey in May 2024 showed that Ukrainians are much wiser on this issue. Yes, individual unsuccessful or erroneous steps of the authorities should be criticized, that is, few people talk about the need to be silent or introduce censorship. At the same time, the majority of Ukrainians believe that criticism should be within constructive frameworks. This is exactly the case when Vox populi Vox Dei (“voice of the people is the voice of God”) and it would be good if Ukrainian subjects adhered to it.

Source – KIIS

 

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