New York City, 27 September 2024
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Thank you for your nice words and thank you very much for inviting me here. It honours me.
I know that the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) is the place to be for an international diplomatic leader visiting New York at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) meeting.
I think it is my eighth UNGA meeting. Some days ago I was at my old university in Stanford, California, delivering a lecture. The dean, when he introduced me, said: “Mr Borrell is one of our scholars.”. Fifty years ago – I was a little bit astonished by the fact that it was fifty years ago when I had the great pleasure of studying at Stanford.
And now here I am in New York in difficult times.
Difficult times which are marked by the return of interstate wars that we thought were over. Yes, there are wars, but they are not interstate wars. Seen from a European perspective, this is big news.
And then there is a proliferation of civil wars and the multiplication of tensions in the Sahel, South China Sea, Sudan, Yemen, and many other spots devastated by misery, by strife, and by war.
I have been recently in the Red Sea, the Gulf, in front of Yemen, in the Sahel.
Everywhere you have a look you find the same thing: you find wars, you have fights, misery, and people trying to escape. Hundreds of thousands of people trying to escape.
In the face of this situations, the capacity of external players – as we are – it tends to decrease. I have to admit it. Our capacity to influence these events decreases. When people ask me “what are you going to do”? In some cases, I have to have the humility to say: “well, what can I do in order to stop the civil war in Sudan? Very little.”
This is a reality for us. For the Europeans, but also for you, for the United States. Do we play a crucial role in Ukraine? Yes. Without us, without you, Ukraine would have had to surrender. They are still fighting, but we cannot determine the outcome.
I was in Kyiv and I saw the Russian tanks destroyed 8 kilometres [away from] the Ukrainian parliament. 8 kilometres the first tank, and the last tank that arrived was destroyed. 8 kilometres is about 20 minutes – so 20 minutes later the tank would have been in the Ukrainian capital. We cannot determine what is going to be the final solution for this war.
We have a significant leverage in the Middle East, but we have been unable to bring about a ceasefire in Gaza. [It has been] impossible. President [of the United States, Joseph] Biden announced I do not know how many weeks ago: “I have a plan. I have an [Peace] Plan.” [Yet] still no agreement.
We have been unable to prevent the extension of the Israeli-Iranian conflict to Lebanon – because what is happening in Lebanon is exactly that: an Israeli-Iranian conflict keeping the Lebanese society kidnapped by this conflict.
Well, what we, Europeans, stand [for]? Where do we stand, in relation to these warring realities?
To start with, let me try to explain what Europe is. I know you know – or maybe you do not know. Europe – what is Europe? Well, I am talking about the European Union, and above all, I want to remind you our relationship with power.
Often, what the European project means historically is misunderstood or misinterpreted. It was built against the idea of power; that is the fundamental point. Which makes the idea of power a very new idea for the Europeans today. It was and old idea for the former generation of Europeans who were fighting against others for centuries.
We fought so much among us that finally we decided to stop doing it and made peace. The European project was founded on the idea of peace, exchange, cooperation, interdependence, vanishing borders, sharing the same currency. This was the idea of institution-building which started with the Treaty of Rome – [19]57 – but this moment – Rome ‘57 – came after the Suez debacle when France and Great Britain were forced to withdraw their forces from the canal and go back home under the pressure of the United States and Soviet Union who told us: “[it is] finished. Colonial wars are over. Stop it, go back home.”
Then, I think that the French and the Britons understood that they had to put aside the idea of war. Then came the Russian crash in Budapest, that made the Germans to understand that the Russians were there to stay. To try to build a union, putting defence and security in the hands of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) – meaning the United States.
Today, this situation has become untenable. One way or another, Europe is again obliged to think about power. My job is not just foreign policy; it is foreign, security, and defence policy.
When I came to Brussels, everything was about foreign policy, and I was considered the top diplomat. Now, more and more, I am considered as a Defence Minister. Well, not exactly a Minister but someone that takes care of the defence side of his job.
At the beginning, it was just diplomacy, not is building defence capacity, building alliances, increasing the capacity of our defence industry. Arming Ukraine.
More and more I am talking about arms, I am talking about rockets, missiles, planes, to supply Ukraine, and also to increase our defence capacity.
Why is this so? Because we have realised that economic interdependence in which our project was based is being highjacked by political and geostrategic rivalries. Interdependence is good; you depend on me, I depend on you, so we do not make war.
That is why we started buying a lot of Russian gas – 40% of our supply was coming from Putin’s supplies. Until it became a threat. Now we are not buying Russian gas. At least not by pipeline – I have to confess that we still buy a lot, transported by tankers, but no longer by pipes.
We used to believe that trade would be – by itself – a source of security. Trade means security. The french said, [la théorie] du doux commerce. Trading amongst peoples prevents them from making war. That is why we make a lot of relationships with China – investing and trading [relationships].
But then, every interdependence became a weapon. It obliged us to think differently.
The second issue is because we Europeans, we realised that we have common interests to defend. Common threats to face. That we cannot defend much more, much better, and much more successfully, collectively than individually. We discovered that the European Union is a power multiplier for every Member State.
Finally, because while NATO remains fundamental for our security – and I want to stress it, NATO is still fundamental for our security – you may have also other priorities. In fact, you have other priorities than defending Europe.
So, we can no longer ask ourselves every four years where our security will remain. Every four years asking ourselves: “will the Americans continue to be willing to defend and support our defence, or not?”
In fact, there is a consensus on both sides of the Atlantic that Europe must do more on defence. That is true, fully true.
We are, on average, about 2% of Gross National Product (GNP) on defence expenditure. But it varies a lot. Some Member States are at 4%, others are at a very small 1.5%. So, a lot has to be done, and my plea to my colleagues, my Member States is: “do it together.” if we do not do it together, we will waste a lot of money.
This is easy to say, and difficult to do. It will take time. In order to do it quickly, we have to understand that there is something called the ‘instinct’. We are human beings, and we have rationality, and we also have instincts.
We do not have the instinct of power. The instinct of power comes from the sensing of danger. By feeling threatened. By fear. Until now, we did not have this feeling. Go to Israel and you will see how people are afraid. I was having a meeting with the families of the hostages. I understand why they are afraid and they feel fear.
As long as the danger is not effective, and the threat is not materialised, power remains an abstract. Something abstract. When the fear materialises, then power becomes a reality. [It] better becomes a reality. You start thinking in terms of power when you feel the heat of war – or the heat of the threat.
That is why the war in Ukraine has transformed Europe. It has made us be in touch with power. For the first time since the Second World War, danger threat, fear have materialised in an indisputable way.
I will always remember the day in which at 6 o’clock in the morning my phone rang, and a voice on the other side told me: “they are bombing Kyiv. They are bombing Kyiv.” And Kyiv is not very far away from the Polish border.
Yes, Russia invaded a European country. What is important is that the brutality of the Russian invasion helps us unify our perception of the threat. Whereas until then, the Russian threat had not the same meaning in Riga as in Lisbon. Certainly not.
Geography matters, and it matters a lot. If you go to Riga, the Russian threat is there – especially because many people in the Baltics have been deported to Siberia a couple of times, on their previous generations. Something that has never happened in Madrid.
This war has changed a lot of things. Which things? Three things.
First, the war in Ukraine has forced us to tackle the issue of the use of force in Europe, and the need to adjust to this challenge. As I said, we come from a very far away idea of power. We were a benevolent soft power. Now we are a hard power in the making.
This is going to take a long time. We will not be a superpower, as you are, but let’s try to be a power. Let’s try to have the capacity to mobilize our troops, all together.
We are a power in the making, because we want to have a certain capacity to coerce our foes – directly or indirectly. For the first time, we have been granting military aid to Ukraine. Believe me, it’s not negligible.
I was listening the other day, to one of the United States candidates saying: “the Europeans are not doing their part.” Well, if I add up all that we are doing for Ukraine – militarily, economically, financially, humanitarian – it is more than you. It is more than €130 billion. Yes, the military side is smaller, but it is still €45 billion, which is not negligible.
Certainly, without the United States, Ukraine would not be able to resist. But [the European Union’s support] is not negligible, €45 billion on military support.
We have decided to make Ukraine a candidate to be a member of the European Union. This was unthinkable before the war. We are granting a colossal support to Ukraine, taking 5 million refugees. We have reduced our energy dependency on Moscow, which was maybe, for sure too big.
I will have to repeat that it is certainly not enough, but power can only be built gradually.
This war remains an asymmetric war. Before the war, Russia was the number four country in the world by the size of their military expenditure, [number] four. Ukraine was the 37th. The unbalance was quite clear. It is still very much unbalanced.
But I have been in Kiev. I have been in a factory of drones in the underground [level] of a building. I see saw these people inventing and building 500 drones per day, 500 drones per day. They are like a small pizza, like this [gestures], no bigger than that. They can fly about 50 kilometers. They can transport 3 kilograms explosive capacity. They cost about 500 euros. With that, they can destroy a tank.
Thanks to these kinds of new arms that they are developing, they have resisted. We do not allow them to use our arms in order to hit Russia inside Russian territory. I do not agree with this provision, but it is a fact. “No, here is a rocket, here is a missile – but you cannot use it inside the Russian territory.”
But the Russians are attacking them from inside the Russian territory. But [the Ukrainians] are able to produce missiles that can reach a target at 500 kilometres, even at 1,000 kilometres. The other day, they were able to destroy an ammunition dépôt at 700 kilometres from the border using their own missiles produced by themselves, provoking an incredible explosion, 3.0 degrees on the Richter scale, and saving a lot of lives.
I think that we have to support Ukraine more and quicker. We have to establish a military balance, because Putin will not go to the negotiation table unless he believes that he is losing. We have to give Ukraine an economic and a strategic power in front of Russia and let them to decide what it is or not acceptable.
But we have to support them, because without us, without you and us, Ukraine will have to surrender in a couple of weeks.
Despite their whole [efforts], they are strongly dependent on our support.
The second challenge we had is the war in Gaza.
Following the horrific massacres committed by Hamas on October 7th. I know well the reason [why this happened]. I know well the reason. When I was young, I was volunteering in a Kibbutz near Beer Sheva, and there I met my first wife – by the way, the same day the Americans reached the moon. So, I know the region.
My son has studied in the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. I am not Jewish, nor was my wife a Jew [she was] a volunteer, as me. But I know the region. I have been travelling a lot in this part of the world, I know there is a complex historical issue. There are two peoples fighting for the same land and this is the tragic reality that can only be solved by sharing the land. Two peoples fighting for the same land for almost a century. And we Europeans, we have a strong responsibility because we have promised this land several times to different people.
So, the root of the conflict comes from our decisions, promising to the Arabs a ‘Kingdom of Arabia’ expanded to the Mediterranean, and promising a national foyer for the Jewish people. There are two peoples in the same land. And that is not going to change.
But today, we are still a long way from the prospect of Two-states. And perhaps further away than ever, since we are still seeking a ceasefire in Gaza. And all the diplomatic power, and all the leverage of the most powerful countries in the world, the United States, has been unable to make the ceasefire happen.
The ceasefire is not coming, and as Prince Faisal [bin Farhan Al-Saud, Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia] told me the other day, maybe it will never come.
So, if you want to build the Two-State Solution, do not wait for the ceasefire. Start working on it from now on. Because the utopian idea of “first we stop the war and then we start building peace” is completely contrary to the dark reality. We have to overlap the two processes.
Yes, the Palestinian state is far away. Maybe some of the belligerents are not interested in it. But maybe not, it is clear that Netanyahu’s government does not want it. He says that every day.
And on the Palestinian side also, there are extremists who do not want the two states because they do not want the Israeli state.
But the one who wanted, [Yitzhak] Rabin [Former Prime Minister of Israel] was killed. And then it ended the hope to have a peaceful settlement of the conflict. Now the Palestinian civilian population has been taken hostages by Hamas in Gaza. And I think that some of the Israeli society also have this ‘Masada complex’ – You know Masada? The fortress in the desert. We are encircled by the enemy, we have to fight until the end. The end of what?
I think that, however difficult it is, we do not have to give up. Not only in fighting a ceasefire, I know you are working hard on that: Qatar, Egypt.
You have to imagine the day after. [Carl von] Clausewitz [Prussian general] said “No military action has sense without a political purpose.” Which is the political purpose? To eradicate Hamas?
This is not possible. Hamas is an idea. It is a terrorist organization, yes, but apart from that, it is also an idea. You do not kill the ideas. The only way of winning an idea is to propose a better one.
If you propose a better idea, then the old one can die. But to kill an idea by using arms has never happened. Without a political solution, we will enter in a never-ending spiral. And Gaza will become a second Somalia. And the West Bank will become a second Gaza. Maybe South Lebanon is also becoming another Gaza – becoming the battlefield of the confrontation between Israel and Iran.
And it comes with two major risks.
The first is to put at risk the normalisation of the relationship between the Arabs and the Israelis. It was a great advantage, a great jump over to make peace between the Arabs and Israel – not all the Arabs, Saudi Arabia is still not there – but the Abraham’s Accord, the agreement within Egypt and Jordan. These are today in danger. Even the Arab-Israeli relations are in danger, notably with Egypt and Jordan. It certainly is postponing the normalisation with the Saudis.
The second risk is the intensification war between Israel and Iran via Hezbollah and via the Houthis. The Houthis are no longer a tribe in the mountains of Yemen using old fashioned rockets. They are much better trained, much better equipped. I was in the Red Sea on board of a warship of the European navies, and I can tell you that the risk of the Houthis cutting the navigation in the Red Sea – cutting, not just threatening – is a real one.
Well, I only scratched the surface of the complexity of these issues.
Let me say last word about transatlantic relations. They are good; we share the same values and objective. We are democratic systems. We are working on a free economic system. We are allies – but not always aligned. Maybe we have different opinions, and that is perfectly normal.
Europe needs the United States, and the United States need Europe.
And I think that you have an interest in having a strong and sovereign Europe on your side. When I talk about the “strategic autonomy”, something that the Americans were listening with a certain reluctance: “oh, strategic autonomy, what do you mean by that?” Now they look at that with a positive approach. “Yes, develop it. Be strategically autonomous, because it means that you will have a stronger capacity on your own.”
And this makes sense when the United States takes on board the idea that our strength will make NATO stronger, and we are reinforcing each other.
To summarise, we are living in a world with a Global South – which is not against the West – but there is a “new West”: the United States, Europe, Canada, Japan, Korea, and Australia.
There is a “new East”: China, Russia, and North Korea. And just recently, there is a Global South.
This is what we have been discussing this week at the United Nations General Assembly.
This is the new landscape of the world. And in this new world, Europe will have to learn to navigate.
I thank you a lot for your attention.
Link to video: https://audiovisual.ec.europa.eu/en/video/I-261105
Source – EEAS