Fri. Nov 22nd, 2024

Main results of the EU Foreign Affairs Council, 24 June 2024

Jun 24, 2024 , , , , , , ,

Luxembourg, 24 June 2024

Russian aggression against Ukraine

The Council adopted a 14th package of economic and individual restrictive measures targeting high-value sectors of the Russian economy and making it more difficult to circumvent EU sanctions.

The Foreign Affairs Council then discussed the Russian aggression against Ukraine, after a VTC intervention by Ukraine’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Dmytro Kuleba, who updated his EU counterparts on the latest developments on the ground, and the most pressing Ukrainian needs.

The ensuing discussion focused on EU military support to Ukraine.

We need to supply Ukraine with more air defences, more ammunition and more support for the development of its own industrial capacities. Putin continues attacking, targeting mainly the energy infrastructure. It’s clear that Putin wants to prove that Ukraine is vulnerable, and we have to prove that we will support Ukraine.

Josep Borrell, High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy

Ministers welcomed the decision adopted last week on the use of windfall profits from immobilised Russian assets, which will be allocated to the European Peace Facility. This will allow for the swift operationalisation of the windfall profits stemming from Russian assets immobilised in Europe as a result of restrictive measures for the benefit of Ukraine. This should amount to €1.4 billion available in the course of the next month.

The High Representative stressed that the Council was finalising the EU security commitments to Ukraine, and that with such decision the EU will be sending a clear message to Russia about its determination to continue supporting Ukraine.

Situation in the Middle East

The Foreign Affairs Council discussed developments in the Middle East, focusing on the situation on the ground, including the humanitarian situation in Gaza and the suffering of hostages.

The High Representative stressed that three weeks after US President Biden tabled his roadmap to a ceasefire and had received strong international support, in particular EU support, there were still no signs of a possible ceasefire. He also highlighted the insurmountable difficulties for humanitarian support in the absence of it.

In this context, the Council discussed support for the Palestinian Authority and UNRWA, as well as other UN agencies.

Ministers also touched on the rising tensions at Israel’s northern border and the serious risk of spill over in the region. The High Representative expressed support for active mediation efforts, led by the US and France to mitigate confrontation between Israel and Hezbollah, and for Lebanon and Cyprus which had been threatened by Hezbollah.

Lastly, the Council discussed EU support for finding a political solution to the conflict, and agreed to pursue and intensify cooperation with international partners to relaunch a political process towards a two state solution. The possibility of an Association Council with Israel was also discussed.

Western Balkans

EU Foreign Affairs Ministers were then joined by the six Foreign Affairs Ministers from the Western Balkans partner countries to have an informal discussion about stronger common engagement on foreign and security policy over lunch.

We are ready to further deepen the gradual integration and expand our support to the Western Balkan partners. And we expect them to stand together with us in defence of the rule based international order and in particular of Ukraine, notably on the measures taken in order to counter the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Their alignment with our Common Foreign and Security Policy is an expression of their strategic choice and commitment to EU membership. Maintaining close ties with Putin’s regime is not compatible with building a common future with and within the EU.

Josep Borrell, High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy

Georgia

The Foreign Affairs Council discussed Georgia, following up on the exchange of views held at the May Council. The Council discussed in particular the political developments in the country, including the adoption and enforcement of the law on transparency of foreign influence.

We have to regret that there is a widespread disinformation about the European Union and its values coming also from official actors. We heard Georgian voices at the highest level, surprisingly stating that this law is bringing the country closer to the European Union. And I want to be clear. No. This law and all the negative developments around it are pushing Georgia away from the European Union. […] We will increase our support to civil society and media, will counter disinformation and increase support to the electoral process.

Josep Borrell, High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy

The Council discussed possible courses of action in case of a deterioration of the situation and will continue monitoring the situation and adapting EU measures as necessary.

Great lakes region and Tunisia

The Foreign Affairs Council exchanged views on the Great Lakes Region in Africa, including the ongoing crisis in Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and its regional and geopolitical implications. The High Representative announced that the EU would soon nominate a special envoy to the region to implement the EU strategy.

Under current affairs, the Council was informed about political developments in Tunisia and discussed the need to first collectively assess the situation, and then consider how best to manage the EU partnership with the country and uphold EU support for the Tunisian people.

Council conclusions

The Council approve conclusions on:

– the Mid-Term Evaluation of the NDICI-Global Europe external financing instrument

– the update of the EU Guidelines on Children and Armed Conflict

– EU priorities at the United Nations during UNGA79 (September 2023 – September 2024)

– the Annual Report 2024 to the European Council on EU Development Aid Targets

Preparatory documents
Outcome documents
Press releases

Source – EU Council

 

Foreign Affairs Council: Press remarks by High Representative Josep Borrell after the meeting

Luxembourg, 24 June 2024

Check against delivery!

We had important exchanges on Ukraine, on Gaza and [the] Middle East, on Georgia, [and] on the Western Balkans, mainly.

We adopted sanctions against actors of the internal conflict in Sudan, against some cyber criminals for actions against Member States and Ukraine and we adopted the 14th package of sanctions against Russia.

With this package, we will have over 100 listings and a dozen of economic measures to help counter circumvention and to cut Russia’s revenues – mainly in the field of trade with gas, LNG.

We reviewed our military support to Ukraine. This is mainly the most important issue today in concrete terms, because we need to supply Ukraine with more air defences, more ammunition and more support to the development of their own industrial capacities.

You know that Putin continues attacking, targeting mainly the energy infrastructure.

It is clear that Putin wants to prove that Ukraine is vulnerable, and we have to prove that we will support Ukraine.

This weekend, Kharkiv suffered [from] aerial attacks, [resulting in] numerous casualties and big infrastructure damage. Targeting critical energy infrastructure, damaging facilities.

Ministers today agreed on a legal framework for the use of windfall profits from immobilised Russian assets to be allocated to the European Peace Facility.

Unhappily, we came went out of the Council exactly as we came in from the point of view of the seven legal acts [intended] to deblock the European Peace Facility.

We still have one country blocking the use of about €6 billion from the European Peace Facility.

But as I commented this morning, the windfall profits coming from Russian assets frozen in Europe – not the assets themselves – will be used in the swiftest possible manner for the benefit of Ukraine.

€1.4 billion will be available in the course of the next month, and another €1 billion by the end of the year.

This will be allocated to Ukraine, but for these three purposes: air defence, ammunition and supporting the Ukrainian industry – overcoming or circumventing this structural difficulty that we have had in the last year and a half.

We understand that legally, since one Member State did not participate in the decision to use these assets, it has not the right to participate in deciding to which purpose they are allocated.

Work will now speed up without having this blockage that we still have to solve on the European Peace Facility. The leaders will discuss about it at the next European Council.

We are finalising our security commitments with Ukraine. I hope that the work will be completed very soon in order to be able to sign these security commitments maybe still this month, maybe in the margins of the next European Council.

With these security commitments, we send a clear message to Russia about our will to continue supporting Ukraine.

On the other hand, you know that tomorrow the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) with Ukraine and Moldova will start the Ukraine accession and membership, which is the ultimate security guarantee.

On the Middle East: three weeks after President Biden’s proposal, and despite the strong international support, in particular, the European Union support, we are nowhere. We are nowhere in terms of ceasefire.

And [Prime Minister of Israel, Benyamin] Netanyahu’s press conference – I think it was yesterday or this morning – shows clearly that neither side, nor the other is willing to implement this proposal. If they ever had this intention, now it is clear that there is no ceasefire at all.

The humanitarian situation is just disastrous. Yesterday, together with Commissioner [for Crisis Management, Janez] Lenarčič, we issued a joint statement.

The well-respected Cindy McCain, the director of the World Food Programme, has said it loud and clear: there is no progress at all on the humanitarian support entering into Gaza.  Hostages are still being held, thousands of trucks are waiting to enter into [Gaza]. In the meantime, inside, the famine is looming. More than 8,000 children below five years old are facing severe malnutrition. There is no point to continue sending more food to the border, if they cannot come into [Gaza]. It is only a way of questing, because they cannot stay there forever.

This is a real concern for all Member States. Certainly, we have to continue our pressure in order to make the humanitarian support to be able to enter into Gaza. But this is not going to happen without a ceasefire. It is clear now.

What is also a serious concern, is the spillover in the region. We support the active mediation efforts, especially by the United States and France, in order to avoid a confrontation between Israel and Hezbollah. Lebanon can count on our support, and also [can] Cyprus.

We agreed to pursue and intensify our cooperation with our Arab partners to relaunch the political process towards the Two-State solution.

And we confirmed that we will have an Association Council with Israel, since I have a positive answer [from the Israeli Foreign Minister]. This will not be a ‘business as usual’ Association Council meeting. We are not calling this meeting to discuss the Erasmus implementation. It is clear that we have very grave topics to put on the table.

I announced to the Member States that they will receive an assessment of the situation in Gaza and in the West Bank, gathering together, compiling all the information that United Nations agencies have been issuing in the last days or weeks, or even months, about the situation and the humanitarian crisis, and the responsibilities that the United Nations have been denouncing, and in particular in the last report produced by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mr [Volker] Türk.

I want to recall that the Association Council is managed from the European Union side by the High Representative, not by the rotating Presidency [of the Council of the European Union]. In order to hold this meeting, we need a common position that has to be agreed by Member States, by the Council.

So, as long as we do not have a common position, we will not be able to hold an [Association] Council, but we will start working on that – on the agenda and on our common position.

And in order to build this common position, I sent to the Member States a complete inventory of our relationship with Israel and Palestine, and they will receive more information about the situation of human rights in Gaza and in the West Bank.

Everybody agreed to accompany the Palestinian Authority in the implementation of reforms, to make sure they have stability in their finances, including from tax revenues, being withheld by Israel, as requested by G7 leaders recently.

There has been a political agreement on proceeding on the sanctions against Hamas and also violent Israeli settlers. This political agreement will be converted into concrete measures to be adopted soon by written procedure.

All Member States reiterated their support to UNRWA, which is being considered as essential as a life-saving service to Palestinian refugees in Gaza, the West Bank and the region.

We do not know exactly what is the end goal of the Netanyahu government. They continue saying that they will continue the war until total victory. On the other hand, there are voices coming from the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) themselves questioning this purpose.

The fight against Hezbollah [in Lebanon] can bring the whole region into a serious crisis. And that is why, we have to continue our diplomatic efforts in order to provide humanitarian assistance in Gaza and stop the spillover of the war in the region.

This is the summary of what we have to do, apart from continuing engaging with our Arab friends and the United States in order to look for a political solution to a war that does not have a military solution.

We support not only UNRWA, but all United Nations agencies. Any attack against a United Nations agency is destabilising, and we are supporting this institution everywhere, all the time.

Then, we had a lunch and a meeting with the Western Balkans to discuss our strong common engagement on foreign and security policy.

We are ready to further deepen the gradual integration and expand our support to the Western Balkan partners.

We expect them to stand together with us in defence of the rules-based international order, and in particular of Ukraine, and in particular on the measure taken in order to counter the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

The alignment of the Western Balkans countries with our Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) is considered an expression of their strategic choice and commitment to [EU] membership. Maintaining close ties with Putin’s regime is not compatible with building a common future with and within the European Union.

In the afternoon, after the lunch, we had a lively debate on Georgia.

It is the second time in a row – after the May Foreign Affairs Council – that we have discussed worrying political developments in Georgia, including the adoption of this law on “transparency of foreign influence”.

We have to [express] regret that there is a widespread disinformation about the European Union and its values – coming also from official actors. We heard Georgian voices at the highest level surprisingly stating that this law is bringing the country closer to the European Union.

I want to be clear: No. No, this law and all the negative developments around it are pushing Georgia away from the European Union. I cannot be more clear and more concise [on this].

This is pushing Georgia away from the European Union. This statement is being supported by 26 out of 27 Member [States].

There is no unanimity, but we do not need unanimity to make a political evaluation of the situation.

We understand that these dynamics go against the will of the overwhelming majority of the Georgian population.

The overwhelming majority of the [EU Foreign] Ministers today has been very clear about that the Georgia government is bringing the country away from the European Union. And if the government will not change the course of action, Georgia will not progress on its European Union path.

I can say that louder but not clearer. If the government does not change the course of action, Georgia will not progress on the European Union path.

In parallel, we will increase our support to civil society and media. We will counter disinformation and increase support to the electoral process.

I distributed an options paper, and we will continue monitoring the situation and adapt our measures as necessary. We will downgrade our political contacts in reaching out to Georgia. We will reconsider putting on hold our financial assistance to the government, and we will reconsider our support from the European Peace Facility.

This can be done immediately, but we will continue looking at the situation and take more measures in case of further deterioration.

I want to stress that we stand with the Georgian people and their overwhelming choice in favour of democracy and of Georgia’s future inside the European Union.

We discussed about the situation in the Great Lakes region and in Tunisia.

Tunisia is a very important and longstanding partner for the European Union.

In light of the recent internal and external developments, we needed to collectively assess the situation and second, [to discuss] how to manage our partnership with Tunisia and uphold our support to the Tunisian people, and avoid some events that have been creating some concerns. In particular, the drive closer to Russia, Iran and China that we are perceiving in the country – not in the country, in the government.

But this is a first discussion. We will consider more elements about it and about the situation in the Great Lakes, where we will soon nominate an [EU] Special Representative to implement our strategy [on the Great Lakes].

 

Q&A

My question is on Georgia. You said, High Representative, the word “immediately”. So, should we expect the decisions and the measures that you mentioned, this week? Can you confirm that leaders will decide about all these measures? And what are the measures which do not need unanimity, as you said that one country was against?

One country considers that this kind of law does not jeopardise at all the European path of Georgia.

Can you tell us what was this country?

You can imagine. You do not have to force your imagination too much in order to [guess]. Yes, some measures require unanimity. A political assessment does not require unanimity. To decrease the level of political outreach does not require unanimity – everybody will do it, if they like it. I suppose that the 26 [Member States] will do [it]. To hold the financial assistance to the government is something that once there are two thirds of the Council supporting it, it is for the Commission to implement it. To not continue with the plan of supporting Georgia from the European Peace Facility does not require unanimity either. It requires unanimity to do it, but not to do it is a different question. Other issues could require unanimity but for the time being, they need further reconsideration.

So, what measures will be on the table during the Summit [European Council]? Some additional measures?

The ones that I explained to you, the ones that can be taken immediately. The others will depend on the development of the situation.

Madame Hadja Lahbib, your colleague, [Minister] for Foreign Affairs of Belgium said this morning that she or Ministers are supporting your idea about a Joint Task Force with the Arab countries. Could you elaborate on this idea or instrument that you are suggesting – or you suggested already – to the Arab countries? I have a question about maybe your own feeling, en âme et conscienceas we say in French: do you believe that the war in Gaza is going for months and months ahead or will it be stopped one day soon, let’s say in the summer? Or do you feel personally that it is going to be a long war there?

I am going to jump to Spanish. El Consejo sigue decidido a hacer que nuestra cooperación con nuestros amigos árabes continúe y se profundice. Para eso no necesitamos crear más estructuras de las que ya tenemos. Al menos no de forma inmediata. Tenemos un enviado especial para el proceso de paz en Oriente Medio [Sven Koopmans], que hace su trabajo y va a continuar haciéndolo. El objetivo es coordinarnos con ellos, con los amigos árabes que nos visitaron y también con Estados Unidos, para conseguir el objetivo fundamental, inmediato, urgente, de aumentar la ayuda humanitaria, el alto el fuego y la liberación de los rehenes. Garantizar que cuando las hostilidades acaben la situación en Gaza no derive hacia una ‘somalización’. Que alguien se encargue de mantener un mínimo de orden civil – sin lo cual no hay esperanza de conseguir no ya una paz militar, sino una situación mínimamente estable, con dos millones y medio de personas privadas de todo en medio de un campo de ruinas. Porque esto es lo que va a quedar de Gaza: un campo de ruinas con dos millones de personas privadas de todo, con una crisis alimenticia que no somos capaces de evitar. Por lo tanto, alguien tiene que tomar las riendas de la situación – que es el segundo objetivo. El tercero es la perspectiva política para conseguir una paz estable y duradera. Estos tres objetivos, en el tiempo. El primero es acabar con las hostilidades – liberar a los rehenes y aportar ayuda humanitaria. Lo urgente, lo inmediato. Lo segundo es quién toma el control de un campo de ruinas habitado por dos millones y medio de personas privadas de todo, para garantizar un mínimo de funcionamiento de una sociedad que habrá sido destruida en sus elementos básicos de funcionamiento. Lo tercero es buscar una solución política. Los tres vienen uno detrás de otro, pero se superponen – no hay que esperar a acabar con el segundo para empezar el tercero. Eso es la base de nuestro diálogo con los amigos, nuestros partners, árabes. Lo estamos haciendo, lo seguiremos haciendo. El objetivo es llegar a alguna clase de palanca de acción – llámele usted reuniones políticas al alto nivel, llámele usted conferencia, llámele usted como quiera. No nos vamos a entretener, al menos esta es mi opinión, en crear infraestructuras. Estamos demasiado acostumbrados a discutir sobre el proceso más que sobre el output. Lo que me interesa es el output. A través del trabajo de nuestro enviado especial para el proceso de paz [en Oriente Medio, Sven Koopmans], el mío mismo y el de todos los ministros, estamos en condiciones de avanzar si existe la voluntad política para hacerlo.

¿La guerra va a durar? Pues parece que sí. Pues parece que sí, desgraciadamente. [Es] una guerra que va a poner a prueba la supervivencia de los palestinos en Gaza. De la misma manera que lo que está pasando en el West Bank también va a poner a prueba el derecho internacional – porque todo parece indicar que existe una voluntad clara de anexionarse el West Bank a pequeños trozos. Poco a poco, trocito a trocito. Eso, naturalmente, no va a conducir a la paz, sino todo lo contrario.

I would like to ask you two questions. First, about the Western Balkans ministers meeting. The Serbian Foreign Minister [Marko Juric] stated that for Serbia it is first, membership, then foreign policy alignment. I would like you to comment on that. Is that even possible? The second thing is: why did you call Aleksandar Vučić [President of Serbia] and Albin Kurti [Prime Minister of Kosovo] for a Dialogue in Brussels? What do you expect? Are you not afraid that there can be a little bit of a debacle again?

El compartir la misma política exterior es una de las condiciones para la membresía. El camino hacia Europa pasa por alinear las posiciones en materia de política exterior. No se puede pretender ser un Estado miembro y ser un spoiler de la política exterior común. Bastantes tenemos ya, no necesitamos más. La tarea de construir un acuerdo en materia de política exterior necesita que los nuevos Estados miembros compartan los principios básicos de esta política exterior. Y eso lo sabe de sobra Serbia. Es una de las condiciones en el camino hacia la membresía en la Unión Europea.

Naturalmente me sigo esforzando en hacer que el diálogo entre Serbia y Kosovo llegue a alguna solución operativa. Ya tenemos un acuerdo, tenemos los acuerdos de Ohrid. El problema de los acuerdos [es que] hay que aplicarlos. No han sido las partes capaces de aplicarlos por una razón o por otra. Creo que era necesario volver a retomar las reuniones de alto nivel para saber dónde estamos, sobre todo en un momento en que los Estados miembros están discutiendo mi propuesta de levantar las sanciones contra Kosovo. Si estas sanciones se levantan – espero que sí, al menos esta es mi propuesta, aunque sea de una forma gradual pero rápida – eso puede crear un escenario en el que el diálogo, no digo yo que vaya a retomarse, pero por lo menos no cerrarlo de una forma abrupta. Hace mucho tiempo que los dos líderes no se reúnen en el marco del diálogo, y no quiero darlo por terminado antes de que termine mi mandato.

Link to the video: https://audiovisual.ec.europa.eu/en/video/I-258750

Source – EEAS

 

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