Mon. Sep 16th, 2024
The EU Council has defined five priorities for security and defence. Illustration: DALL-E prompted by IEU/jow

Brussels, 5 March 2024

Today, the European Commission and the High Representative presented the first-ever European Defence Industrial Strategy at EU level and proposed an ambitious set of new actions to support the competitiveness and readiness of its defence industry.

Two years ago, Russia’s unjustified, on-going war of aggression against Ukraine marked the return of high-intensity conflict on our continent. The European Defence Industrial Strategy (EDIS) sets a clear, long-term vision to achieve defence industrial readiness in the European Union. As a first immediate and central means to deliver the Strategy, the European Commission today tables a legislative proposal for a European Defence Industry Programme  (EDIP) and a framework of measures to ensure the timely availability and supply of defence products.

The Strategy outlines the challenges currently faced by the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) but also the opportunity to tap its full potential and sets out a direction for the next decade. To increase European defence industrial readiness, Member States need to invest more, better, together, and European. To support Member States in achieving these goals, the European Defence Industrial Strategy presents a set of actions aiming at:

  • Supporting a more efficient expression of the Member States’ collective defence demand. This will be based on existing instruments and initiatives, such as the Capability Development Plan (CDP), the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) and the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). It will be supported by incentivising Member States’ cooperation in the procurement phase of defence capabilities;
  • Securing the availability of all defence products through a more responsive EDTIB, under any circumstances and time horizon. Investments by Member States and the European defence industry in developing and bringing to market tomorrow’s state of the art defence technologies and capabilities will be supported. Measures are also proposed to ensure that the EDTIB has at its disposal what it needs even in crisis periods, thereby increasing the EU’s Security of Supply;
  • Ensuring that national and EU budgets support with the necessary means the adaptation of the European defence industry to the new security context;
  • Mainstreaming a defence readiness culture across policies, notably by calling for a review of the European Investment Bank’s lending policy this year;
  • Developing closer ties with Ukraine through its participation in Union initiatives in support of defence industry and stimulating cooperation between the EU and Ukrainian defence industries;
  • Teaming up with NATO and our strategic, like-minded and international partners, and cooperating more closely with Ukraine.

The Strategy sets indicators, aimed at measuring Member States’ progress towards industrial readiness. Member States are invited to:

  • Procure at least 40% of defence equipment in a collaborative manner by 2030;
  • Ensure that, by 2030, the value of intra-EU defence trade represents at least 35% of the value of the EU defence market;
  • Make steady progress towards procuring at least 50% of their defence procurement budget within the EU by 2030 and 60% by 2035.

The European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP) is the new legislative initiative that will bridge from short-term emergency measures, adopted in 2023 and ending in 2025, to a more structural and longer-term approach to achieve defence industrial readiness. This will ensure continuity in the support to the European defence technological and industrial base, to accompany its swift adaptation to the new reality.

EDIP includes both financial and regulatory aspects. EDIP will mobilise €1.5 billion of the EU budget over the period 2025-2027, to continue enhancing the competitiveness of the EDTIB. EDIP financial support will notably extend the intervention logic of EDIRPA (financial support from EU budget to offset the complexity of cooperation between Member States in the procurement phase) and ASAP (financial support to defence industries increasing their production capacity), to further encourage investments by the EDTIB. EDIP will also support the industrialisation of products stemming from cooperative R&D actions supported by the European Defence Fund. The EDIP budget may  also be used to set up a Fund to Accelerate defence Supply chains Transformation (FAST). That new fund will aim at facilitating access to debt and/or equity financing for SMEs and small midcaps industrialising defence technologies and/or manufacturing defence products. EDIP budget will also enhance the EU’s defence industrial cooperation with Ukraine and support the development of its defence industrial and technological base. To do so, EDIP could possibly draw  additional funding from the windfall profits derived from  immobilised Russian sovereign assets (subject to Council decision on a proposal by the High Representative).

On the regulatory aspects, EDIP comes with novel solutions. It will make available a new legal framework, the Structure for European Armament Programme (SEAP), to facilitate and scale up Member States’ cooperation on defence equipment, in full complementarity with the PESCO framework. It also entails an EU-wide regime for security of supply of defence equipment, which will ensure constant access to all necessary defence products in Europe and provide a framework to efficiently react to possible future supply crises of defence products. In addition, EDIP will allow the launch of European Defence Projects of Common Interest, with potential EU financial support. Finally, EDIP proposes to set up a governance structure, where Member States are fully involved, to ensure overall consistency of EU action in the field of defence industry (the Defence Industrial Readiness Board).

A stronger and more responsive European defence industry will benefit the Member States and ultimately EU citizens. It will also benefit the EU’s key partners, including NATO and Ukraine.

For More Information

Quote(s)

Today, we adopt a European Defence Industrial Strategy and table a proposal for a European Defence Industry Programme. We do so to respond to changes in Europe’s security paradigm. Our defence spending goes to too many different weapon systems, primarily bought from outside the EU. Now that defence budgets in all Member States are rising sharply, we should invest better, which largely means investing together, and investing European. This will enable us to move from a crisis response mode, to one of structural defence readiness. In a manner that closely integrates Ukraine.

Margrethe Vestager, Executive Vice-President for a Europe Fit for the Digital Age

Russia’s brutal war of aggression against Ukraine has brought back high intensity warfare to Europe. After decades of under-spending, we must invest more on defence, but we need to do it better and together. A strong, resilient, and competitive European defence industry is a strategic imperative and a pre-condition to enhance our defence readiness. We must also step up our military support to Ukraine, including by supporting its defence industrial base. This Strategy marks a paradigm shift towards a Union that is a strong security and defence actor and a better partner, in line with objectives of the Strategic Compass.

High Representative/Vice-President Josep Borrell

Today the European Union demonstrates again our firm determination and commitment to scale up our defence and support to Ukraine. With our new industrial defence strategy, the Union sets a clear vision to enhance our defence industrial readiness. With the European Defence Industry Programme, the Commission immediately tables an ambitious instrument to start concretely implementing the Strategy. With the return of high intensity conflict on our continent, Europe cannot wait any longer to strengthen the European defence technological and industrial base’s ability to produce more and faster.

Thierry Breton, Commissioner for Internal Market

Questions and answers on the European Defence Industrial Strategy and the European Defence Industry Programme

5 March 2024

Why propose a European Defence Industrial Strategy?

Faced with the return of conventional, high-intensity warfare on European soil, the European Union and its Member States need to step up their preparedness. A crucial element in this respect is the capacity of the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) to deliver to Member States’ armed forces the defence systems and equipment they require, when needed and in the volumes needed.

Russia’s illegal war of aggression against Ukraine prompted the EU to implement, in record time, two emergency instruments to respectively stimulate joint procurement (EDIRPA) and ramp up the production of ammunition (ASAP), building also on the EU’s three-track ammunition initiative and the successful experience of the Defence Joint Procurement Task Force.

It is now time for the EU to move from these ad-hoc, emergency responses to establishing the structural conditions of the EU’s defence industrial readiness on a lasting basis. Achieving such defence industrial readiness requires a strong and responsive EU defence industry. The Strategy proposes in this respect a comprehensive and ambitious approach, underpinned by the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP), to support – building on already established defence initiatives and tools – the EDTIB’s greater competitiveness, responsiveness and resilience over the next decade.

This ambitious Strategy offers a set of measures that will enable EU Member States to spend more, better, together, and European, to ramp up our defence industry, to enhance our security of supply, and to also build partnerships in support of these objectives.

What are the main objectives of this Strategy?

The Strategy aims at strengthening the industrial pillar of EU defence readiness. Defence industrial readiness, today and in the future, requires more public and private investments across the full spectrum of needs, and greater defence industry responsiveness, in time and scale, to the needs of Member States. Innovation must also remain a constant focus of attention, whilst resilience to external shocks and disruptions must also be ensured through an enhanced security of supply framework.

The European defence industry is a crucial contributor to the resilience, stability and security of the Union and its Member States. But to realise its full potential while Member States are increasing their defence budgets, it is essential that these increases translate into more cooperation at EU level, both in procurement by Member States and at industrial level, to fully enable the EDTIB to serve the EU’s needs. This calls on the Member States to decisively address the persistent trend of demand fragmentation, to make the most out of the additional investments being made.

This Strategy proposes measures to support the Member States’ efforts to invest better, together, and European as well as to increase the availability of defence products and systems, thanks to a more efficient and responsive EDTIB and an enhanced Security of Supply.

Underpinning EU defence industrial readiness requires the development of adequate financial means and the mainstreaming of a defence readiness culture, including across EU policies, where relevant. The Strategy also aims to leverage partnerships to enhance readiness and resilience.

How will the Commission and the High Representative encourage Member States to invest more, better, together and European?

The Strategy, building also on existing EU defence initiatives and tools, will propose a range of measures to encourage Member States to invest more, better, together and European, for instance:

  • A new joint programming and procurement function, by creating a Defence Industrial Readiness Board bringing together Member States, the High Representative/Head of the European Defence Agency and the Commission, providing for a structured approach to programming and procurement with the objective of reinforcing transparency, coordination and consistency.
  • Provisions in the new European Defence Industry Programme to extend the intervention logic of the Regulation on establishing an instrument for the reinforcement of the European defence industry through common procurement (EDIRPA), by incentivising cooperation in the procurement phase of defence products manufactured by the EDTIB. The objective is to help make common procurement the norm whenever relevant.
  • A new legal framework made available to Member States, called the Structure for European Armament Programme, as a vehicle to support defence cooperation throughout the capability life cycle, and potentially benefiting from a VAT exemption.
  • The launch of European Defence Projects of common interest contributing to secure access to strategic domains and contested spaces.
  • The creation of a pilot European Military Sales Mechanism, increasing awareness of the availability of defence products from the EDTIB and facilitating their acquisition, including through ‘government to government’ purchases.

The implementation of this strategy will be done in full complementarity with the existing EU defence initiatives and instruments at Member States’ disposal.

How will the EDIP enhance the responsiveness of the European Defence Industry?

The Strategy aims to create the conditions for the EU’s defence industry to meet Member States’ demand over time and in sufficient scale.

With the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP) that accompanies the industrial strategy, the EU will facilitate the industry’s market adaptation to the current security context, through the following measures:

  • Expansion of the Regulation on supporting ammunition production (ASAP) intervention logic, to support the defence industrial ramp-up in the Union, by expanding its scope beyond ammunition and missiles, and complementing it with the development of ‘ever-warm’ facilities and possible repurposing of civilian production lines;
  • Creation, within EDIP, of a Fund to Accelerate Defence Supply Chain Transformation (FAST), particularly targeting SMEs and small mid-caps via debt and/or equity financing;
  • Sustained support towards industrialisation of defence cooperative actions initially supported by EDF (bridging the ‘commercialisation gap’);
  • Establishment of a modular and gradual EU Security of Supply regime to enhance solidarity and effectiveness in response to tensions along the supply chains or security crises and allow for the timely identification of potential bottlenecks.
How will the Strategy mainstream defence industrial readiness culture?

In particular, the defence industry, notably SMEs and small midcaps, needs access to finance, an appropriate regulatory environment and access to a skilled workforce.

The Strategy proposes measures to take full advantage of existing horizontal EU financial instruments. This encompasses inviting EIB Group’s governing bodies to review this yearthe EIB Group’s Lending Policies, and to adapt the currentdefence-related exclusionsin line with EU policy priorities and applicable law,to ensure the defence sector has access to and can fully benefit from EU financial instruments. Such a modification will also have positive cascading effects, by giving a significant positive signal to the financial market and private banks.

The Strategy also proposes including or maintaining defence readiness, security and resilience as an explicit strategic objective under future relevant EU programmes to ensure that they support fully the EDTIB, and that the implementing partners and intermediaries (in the case of indirect management) face no obstacles in pursuing those objectives.

What does the Strategy foresee on budgetary means to sustain the EU ambition?

The strategy calls for a renewed ambition when it comes to budgetary means in the current MFF (notably via the EDIP) as well as the next MFF. A strengthened budgetary support is crucial to implement a new ambition for defence industrial readiness at EU level. The proposal for a Regulation establishing EDIP includes a budget of €1.5 billion, which should be complemented by additional amounts for the development of the Ukrainian DTIB and its closer integration with the EDTIB and the Union defence equipment market. Subject to a decision by the Council upon a proposal by the High Representative, a share of the windfall profits derived by central securities depositories from immobilised Russian sovereign assets could be used  (as and when immediate Ukrainian defence needs permit) to fund support under the proposed EDIP for Ukraine and its defence technological and industrial base.

In light of the scale and the efforts needed to ensure defence industrial readiness across the Union, the present EDIP budget should be considered as a bridge towards the next MFF. In this regard, the strategy outlines the importance for the next MFF to include an ambitious financial envelope on defence, with relevant budgets for the successors of both EDF and EDIP for the period from 2028 onwards.

In view of this objective, the strategy calls for the launch of a discussion to quantify the EU’s financing needs for defence industrial readiness which would be commensurate with the change of the security paradigm. This requires initiating soon a joint exploration with Member States to assess needs and options to boost the financial support for available instruments that serve to implement the strategy’s ambition.

What is foreseen for Ukraine in this Strategy?

The Ukrainian and the European Defence Industrial and Technological base can mutually benefit from their strengthened cooperation.

In this regard, it is proposed that the Ukrainian industry be able to participate in the Union’s programme in support of the defence industry. The proposed EDIP thus provides the possibility for Ukraine to participate in cooperation on common procurement and for Ukrainian defence companies to be supported in their industrial ramp-up and cooperation together with the European Defence Industrial and Technological Base.

The Strategy also aims to stimulate cooperation between the Ukrainian and the European industry and to foster dedicated information exchange on standards and on respective lessons learned. The EU will also host an EU-Ukraine Defence Industry Forum in 2024, to bolster cooperation between Ukrainian and EU defence industries.

To ensure matchmaking between the Union’s start-ups and innovators and Ukraine’s industry and armed forces, the EU will open an Innovation Office in Kyiv.

What does the Strategy propose regarding partnership with NATO and  third countries?

The Strategy underlines that a stronger and more capable EU in security and defence will contribute to global and transatlantic security and is complementary to NATO, which remains the foundation of collective defence for its members. The Strategy proposes enhanced staff-to-staff structured dialogue with NATO on defence industry-related activities and topics of mutual interest, including on circular economy, interoperability, industry aspects of climate change, interoperability, standardisation and cross-certification, and responses to new and emerging threats. It recalls in particular that the NATO standards (STANAGs) are the main reference for the work in this area by the EDA, and that the EDF promotes the use of defence standards such as the STANAGs.

The Strategy also proposes that both organisations should continue to exchange views and explore synergies and complementarity of efforts in the realm of supply chain security essential to capability development and delivery.

The Strategy highlights the importance of strengthening mutually beneficial partnerships with like-minded third countries and strategic partners – whether European, trans-Atlantic or beyond – as they can amplify the Union’s efforts towards defence industrial readiness.

It proposes flexible cooperation, varying in form, scope and types of participants in areas of shared interests. Such a cooperation should contribute to further secure supply chains, reinforce the EDTIB and reduce EU’s strategic dependencies, without creating new (or perpetuating existing) ones.

What is the relationship between the Strategy and the European Defence Fund? And with EDIRPA and ASAP?

The Strategy aims to build on and complement existing instruments. For instance, by acknowledging the success of the European Defence Fund in enhancing defence research collaboration between Member States, EDIS proposes measures to sustain support towards industrialisation, to ensure EDF projects become a tangible reality beyond the R&D phase.

Similarly, the Strategy, through the proposal for a European Defence Industry Programme, aims at extending the logic of existing emergency instruments, such as EDIRPA and ASAP, both over time and in scope, to support the defence market adaptation to the new security context.

Both emergency instruments, ASAP and EDIRPA, and the EDF will end in 2025 and 2027 respectively and will need to be followed by longer term instruments. The idea is for new longer-term instruments to build on the experience and lessons learned deriving from the existing programmes.

What will be the role of the Board?

The Defence Industrial Readiness Board will bring together, in full respect of their respective competences, Member States, the High Representative/Head of the Agency, and the Commission – to perform the EU defence joint programming and procurement function envisaged in the Joint Communication on Defence Investment Gap Analysis and  to support the implementation of EDIP.

First, to perform the EU defence joint programming and procurement function, the work in the context of the Board will be co-chaired by the Commission and the High Representative/Head of Agency. This format will build on the work of the Defence Joint Procurement Task Force, and provide a forum to discuss and refine identified priorities at EU level. This format should also support the coordination and de-confliction of Member States’ procurement plans and provide strategic guidance in view of more effectively matching demand and supply. In this regard, the Board should support increased Member States’ visibility on the EDTIB production capacities.

Second, for the purpose of supporting the implementation of EDIP, the Board will be formally established within the EDIP Regulation notably to ensure security of supply at EU level but also inform and assist in the implementation of the different supporting measures to the EDTIB established in EDIP. In this configuration, the Board itself will be chaired by the Commission.

Complementing this effort, to ensure an effective government-to-industry co-operation and to establish a closer dialogue and engagement, the Strategy envisages a high-level European Defence Industry Group. This Group will meet in specific configurations (e.g. sector-specific), depending on the issue at hand, and is intended to have a consultative role with the objective of increasing consistency between Member States’ plans and what the EDTIB can deliver.

What is meant by European Military Sales Mechanism?

A European Military Sales Mechanism will facilitate the availability of defence products from the EDTIB and will increase awareness of such availability. The Commission and the High Representative/Head of the Agency will cooperate towards its creation.

The Commission proposes to test such a mechanism through a pilot project within EDIP with a view to co-building with Member States and industry a fully-fledged mechanism from 2028 onwards. The pilot mechanism will be organised in four pillars:

  • The establishment of a single, centralised, up to date catalogue of defence products developed by the EDTIB.
  • The creation of defence industrial readiness pools, to increase availability and speed up delivery time of EU-made defence products (including for ‘government-to-government’ sales).
  • Financial support for the purchase of additional quantities for such pools of defence capabilities which Member States have decided to jointly procure within the Structure for European Armament Programme.
  • The introduction of a standard regime applicable to future defence contracts and framework agreements with EU-based manufacturers.
Where should we stand in 2035?

Achieving European defence industrial readiness requires more cooperation and a collective effort. In this respect, the Strategy sets three indicators for the next decade to measure Member States’ progress, namely:

  • Member States are invited to ensure that, by 2030, the value of intra-EU defence trade represents at least 35% of the value of the EU defence market;
  • Member States are invited to make steady progress towards procuring at least 50% of their defence procurement budget within the EU by 2030, and 60% by 2035;
  • Member States are invited to procure at least 40% of defence equipment in a collaborative manner by 2030.

Currently only limited budget is devoted to collaborative defence procurement (well below the 35% benchmark set within the EDA framework). Moreover, the majority of defence acquisitions is done from outside the EU, especially since the war against Ukraine started, and the level of intra-EU trade has decreased, notwithstanding a growing EU defence market.

Increased cooperation, as the precondition to overcoming persistent inefficiencies, is key to achieve resilience commensurate with the threat level. Member States should tap the full opportunities offered by the EDTIB by cooperating across the full range of investment and acquisition. In this regard, the significant incentives provided at EU level by EDIRPA and EDIP, combined with experience in the context of the EPF and the greater sense of necessity, urgency and solidarity resulting from the current geopolitical situation, make these indicators both essential and realistic.

What is the relationship between this Strategy and the Strategic Compass and EU defence initiatives such as CDP, CARD, PESCO?

The Strategy aims to underpin the objectives proposed in the Strategic Compass, notably by enhancing defence investment and ensuring better return on investment. It is also built on the strategic objectives and collaborative approaches adopted under the Capability Development Plan (CDP) and the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) and provides for measures that can support Member States’ cooperative efforts within the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) framework. The CDP and its priorities serve as a key reference document for defence planning EU-wide and for all defence-related initiatives and instruments such as CARDPESCO and the European Defence Fund (EDF).

The Strategy puts forward concrete actions, which are in coherence with the PESCO framework and could facilitate and support the implementation of PESCO projects as well as contribute to the fulfilment of the more binding commitments undertaken by the 26 participating Member States. The ongoing PESCO Strategic Review provides the opportunity to enhance the PESCO more binding commitments related to the EDTIB and to consider possible new commitments, notably on joint procurement from the EDTIB, in line with the EDIS’ ambition. These commitments could also be taken into account in the establishment and implementation of the PESCO projects.

What is the added value of the European Defence Industry Programme?

Russia’s ongoing war of aggression against Ukraine has marked the dramatic return of high-intensity warfare on European soil. Although we have already taken action to tackle the most urgent consequences of this war, the EU and its Member States still need to scale up their effort to achieve a real defence industrial readiness. The European defence industry must be able to respond effectively, in time and scale, to an evolving European demand for defence products as well as that of the EU’s closest partners.

Announced by the Joint Communication of May 2022, and called for by the European Council, EDIP will aim to emulate the urgent crisis response mode into a longer-term, more structured, steady-state approach, by maintaining EU support for the EDTIB under this Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) and strengthening the EU’s defence industrial readiness for the future. In doing so, EDIP will give effect to a number of concrete measures proposed in the European Defence Industrial Strategy.

What is the objective of EDIP?

The EDIP pursues three objectives:

  • First, EDIP will strengthen the competitiveness, resilience and responsiveness of the European Defence Industry.
  • Second, EDIP will enhance the ability of the European Defence Industry to ensure the timely production, availability and supply of defence products.
  • Third, EDIP will contribute to the recovery, reconstruction and modernisation of the Ukrainian Defence industry.

Through the achievement of these three interlinked objectives, the EU will be able to truly scale up its defence industrial readiness.

What support is foreseen for SMEs?

The Fund to Accelerate defence Supply chains Transformation (FAST) will focus exclusively on SMEs and small Mid-Caps in the defence sector. Building on the experience with the set-up of the defence equity facility under the European Defence Fund, FAST will offer support in the form of debt and/or equity to support investment in the ramp up of production capacities.

What is the SEAP? Who can participate to it? What is the relationship to PESCO?

The Structure for European Armament Programme (SEAP) provides a voluntary legal framework for Member States to incentivise and facilitate armament cooperation throughout the life-cycle of defence products. This means that 3 Member States or more willing to cooperate to jointly develop, procure, use and maintain defence equipment will be able to use the SEAP framework to implement their cooperation. The participation in a SEAP requires Member States to invest in Union defence industry. It also provides specific benefits for the cooperation:

  • Favourable access to EU funding.
  • Harmonised and simplified joint procurement rules.
  • VAT waiver in case of joint ownership by the SEAP.
  • Incentives to adopt a common approach to export control of the equipment.

The participation in a SEAP will be open to Member States, Associated Countries (e.g. Norway) and Ukraine.

The SEAP framework is complementary to the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). It represents an opportunity for Member States to build on  their collaborative projects  within PESCO. The SEAP framework can serve the implementation of PESCO projects, and contribute to the fulfilment of the more binding commitments in this context.

Furthermore, under certain conditions, actions developed in the context of PESCO projects may also benefit from a bonus under the EDIP .

How will the Security of Supply of defence equipment be enhanced through EDIP?

Ensuring the security of European citizens depends, amongst other things, on the timely availability of defence goods and services in sufficient quantities. Therefore, to ensure the functioning of the internal market, by avoiding shortages of defence products in the Union, EDIP will set up an EU-wide security of supply regime for defence equipment. This regime, which is modular and gradual, will involve a number of aspects, including:

  • Firstly, EDIP includes measures to enhance the preparedness of Member States in the new geopolitical context, characterized notably by the need to replenish stocks and further expand defence capabilities as soon as possible.
  • Secondly, EDIP encompasses measures to perform an identification and monitoring of critical products and industrial capacities in the supply chains of any relevant defence products.
  • Thirdly, when a supply crisis arises, EDIP will provide for a modular crisis management framework, to be implemented gradually, with the possibility given to Member States to decide on the most appropriate stage of crisis management and, for the more serious crises, on measures to be activated.

With this regime, EDIP will ensure that supply disruptions are well anticipated and addressed without delay to preserve the functioning of the internal market and enhance solidarity and effectiveness in response to tensions along the supply chains or security crises.

What is foreseen for Ukraine?

EDIP will provide the possibility for Ukraine to participate in joint procurement and for the Ukrainian defence industry to be supported in their industrial ramp up. To this end, EDIP foresees a specific budget line to support such actions. Subject to a decision by the Council upon a proposal by the High Representative, a share of the windfall profits derived by central securities depositories from immobilised Russian sovereign assets could be used (as and when immediate Ukrainian defence needs permit) to fund this budget line.

How do EDIS and EDIP relate to the division of competences under the EU Treaties in the field of defence?

The EDIS recognises that the defence of the Member States’ territory and citizens is primarily a national responsibility, including through allies’ commitments in the context of NATO. EDIP fully respects Member States’ competences in the field of defence. Reflecting the feedback received during the consultation to inform the European defence industrial strategy, EDIP has been designed to build on already established defence initiatives and EU actions to ensure that these instruments are utilised to support the EDTIB in the most effective way, and to create viable choices for Member States regarding the equipment of their armed forces. For instance, with the SEAP framework, EDIP can usefully complement the efforts undertaken by Member States in the context of PESCO and help them deliver on their related more binding commitments.

Moreover, Member States are at the heart of EDIP’s security of supply regime, they will be responsible for identifying defence products for which scrutiny and vigilance of defence supply chains are necessary. Member States are also the final decision makers (through the Council) on the most appropriate crisis stages and proportionate measures to be put in place to address supply crisis of defence products.

Source – EU  Commission

 


Remarks by Executive Vice-President Vestager, EU HR Borrell, and EU Commissioner Breton at the press conference on the European Defence Industrial Strategy and the European Defence Industry Programme

“Check against delivery”

Remarks by Executive Vice-President Vestager

Today we adopt a European Defence Industrial Strategy, and table a proposal for a European Defence Industry Programme. We do so to respond to changes in Europe’s security paradigm.

Because not far away, the Ukrainians are fighting for their freedom and our common values, in a war that already caused immense human tragedies.

In the last two years, we have faced the situation of a defence industry without sufficient production capacity to meet the sharp increase of demand. We have been vividly confronted with a well-known structural fragmentation along national borders that limits economies of scale, and creates mistrust, while preventing genuine competition between industrial players. This entails major inefficiencies, and insufficient value for taxpayer’s money.

Furthermore, Member States spend on many different types of equipment, so that we often have two, three, four, even five types or more, of each weapons system than the United States. This creates redundancies, inefficiencies and prevents value for money from economies of scale.

Also, since the start of the war until June 2023, Member states have spent over 100 billion euros on defence acquisitions. Almost 80 per cent of that was spent outside the Union, and the U.S. alone accounted for more than 60 per cent of this spending.

This is no longer sustainable, if it ever was. Defence budgets in all Member States are rising sharply, so we should change the way we spend. Since we want to invest more, we should invest better, which largely means investing together and investing European.

This is the message and the toolbox of the package that we present today. In order to enable us to move from a crisis response mode, to one of structural defence readiness. In a manner that closely involves Ukraine.

I will mention some of the specifics of the package.

First, we propose a joint programming and procurement function, performed through a new European Defence Industrial Readiness Board, composed of Member States, the Commission and the High Representative. The Board will help us draw overall priorities, and inform how we use the different EU instruments at our disposal.

Second, the Defence Industry Programme will take over the role of the instruments we set up in response to the war: the European Defence Industrial Reinforcement through Procurement Act (EDIRPA) and the Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP), once they expire at the end of 2025. And it will expand their scope to all defence products, as well as incorporate new tasks.

Third, with the “Structure for European Armament Programme”, we create a legal framework to encourage Member States to cooperate more, for instance through common procurement or joint life-cycle management of defence products.

Fourth, we enable the Member States to set up European Defence Projects of Common Interest, so they can join forces on strategic projects that no country can do alone.

To support this, the Programme has an initial budget of 1.5 billion euros. This budget, used strategically, can serve to incentivise the type of actions that help our Member States deliver. We propose to achieve the goal, by 2030, of procuring 40% of equipment in a collaborative manner, and to procure 50% of equipment within the EU.

Beyond this, let me underline two political balances that I see as essential in relation to this Strategy.

First, we need to get the Transatlantic balance right.

Irrespective of electoral dynamics in the U.S., we must take more responsibility for our own security, while remaining fully committed to the NATO alliance. An improved ability to act will make us a stronger ally.

I believe the EU is ready to step up further. When doing so, Member states will invest in economic prosperity, job creation and technological innovation in Europe. All while ensuring interoperability with NATO.

Which brings us to the second political balance: we need to get the internal balance right.

It is a priority to ensure a real pan-European defence market where this value creation is well distributed and shared across the Union. A continental defence market should create opportunities for every European player. Some of the most innovative companies are small players, many coming from the civilian side, whose products can help give our militaries an edge.

The Strategy and Programme we present today tackle this head on, by incentivizing cross-border cooperation and putting a strong focus on boosting the role of SMEs and small mid-caps. We will do that through a dedicated funding.

And we want to fully integrate the Ukrainian defence industry into this ecosystem. We have seen how technological breakthroughs can help get an edge on the battleground. Our new defence innovation office in Kyiv will help transmit advancements in both directions.

With the necessary political will, and if get those balances right, we can foster a European defence industry that is up to the new security challenges that we face.

 

***

Remarks by High Representative/Vice-President Borrell

Thank you. Thank you, Margrethe [Vestager, Executive Vice-President of the European Commission].

I am going to talk more on the perspective of my role as High Representative for the Security and Defence Policy and Head of the European Defence Agency. Thank you for the good cooperation in order to make this [Joint] Communication.

Maybe, you will remember that, two years ago, when presenting the Strategic Compass, I said “Europe is in danger”. Well, I am sorry, I was right. Europe was in danger and [today] is still [even] more in danger.

Peace is no more a given, unhappily. The war is at our borders.

Russia’s war of aggression has brought a great sense of urgency to step up our industrial defence capacities.

At the beginning, the war was fed by stocks. Now, we go to an industrial production war. Because the war has lasted two years, it does not seem it is going to be finished soon and the needs of military equipment have been increasing, exhausting stocks and increasing the capacity of our industrial production.

Certainly, the European Union has answered in an unprecedented manner. This war has changed the way we look at our defence capabilities.

The European Union is not a military alliance, but the Treaties express [the will] to build a Common Security and Defence Policy. And part of this Common Security and Defence Policy is to have good [and] efficient industrial basis.

We have done a lot through the European Peace Facility to supply what we have. Now we have to move from [an] emergency mode – urgency – to a medium and long-term vision that strengthens our defence industrial readiness, to continue providing military support to Ukraine.

It is no longer a matter of looking at the stocks but being able to produce a continuous flow of production.

On ammunition, for example, the industry has answered quickly to the emergency. The European defence industry has increased its industrial capacity by 50% since the start of the war. And I want to thank Commissioner [for Internal Market, Thierry] Breton for pushing the industry. And the industry has answered: 50% increase of capacity since the beginning of the war is a remarkable increase.

And today, what we lack is not production capacity, [it] is financing. In the short term, we have production capacity, [but] we need financing. But looking a little bit ahead, we need more production capacity.

We increased [it by] 50%, it has to still increase more and quicker – but funding is fundamental. We do not have a Pentagon in Europe. We do not have an institution that has a strong buying capacity driving the market and driving the industry.

But we have to cooperate and coordinate the way the Member States react in order to provide funding for the industry and the capacity for the industry in order to answer the increasing demand.

We need to do more, not only on ammunition. In the medium term, we need to increase – as Margrethe has said and Commissioner Breton will explain more in detail – the strength and resilience of the European defence industry.

We need a defence industrial policy, because the defence industry is unique. You do not go to the supermarket to buy defence products. There is a single buyer – the Governments. And there is a variety of producers but 90% of the industrial defence capacity is being concentrated in a few Member States.

Our defence industry, before the war, secured about 40% of the defence needs of our armies and export about half of its production. So, our industry is competitive – half of its production goes to exports. But since the beginning of the war, the amount of our need to buy outside has been increasing. But keep in mind that Governments are the buyers – they set the priorities based on operational needs. Working together with Member States is crucial because they are the masters of their armies.

This Strategy tries to match supply and demand, through procedures to invest more, better, together and European. We have to overcome fragmentation by cooperation.

Our demand is fragmented – obviously, because we have different national armies. As I said, we do not have an institution that concentrates the capacity to demand and drive the industry.

We are divided in 27 Member States, with 27 different armies. So, this has to increase our cooperation.

Keep in mind one figure: in 2022, the defence investment of our Member States amounted to €58 billion – fragmented among 27 “demand centres” (Member States). In the United States, a single one – the Pentagon – was asking the market for $215 billion, almost four times more.

As I said, since the beginning of the war, we have to request more imports because our industry was on an increasing demand.

Our cooperation is still very low. Only 18% [in 2022] of our procurement [was] done in a cooperative manner. The target is 35%.

The European defence industry is following closely this degree of cooperation, and we [have not] improved in the last years. This Strategy will try to incentivise joint procurement of defence capabilities and projects of common European interest.

Fragmentation needs to be addressed with cooperation. Fragmentation is the logical consequence of the fact that we are not a single State, but it has to be overcome by cooperation if we want to spend not more, but better. I will push for the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) to work in this direction.

You mentioned also our cooperation with NATO – for sure. And also, about the financial capacity, and that is related also to the discussions about frozen Russian assets. If we agree that these assets could be used in order to support Ukraine’s reconstruction, it could also be used to avoid Ukraine’s destruction. And it means to increase military capacities or the defence technological base of Ukraine.

But for that, we still need an agreement of the Member States. We need a unanimous agreement based on a Common Foreign and Security Policy proposal that can [be tabled]. But for the time being, we continue working with the Member States in order to get an agreement on that.

It has certainly advantages, and also some inconveniences. But the key idea is that if we can use this money to support Ukraine on the reconstruction process, we should also be able to use it to avoid the destruction of Ukraine by increasing their defence capability.

Thank you.

 

***

Remarks by Commissioner Breton
« L’Europe de la défense est en marche »

Dans le contexte géopolitique que nous connaissons tous, l’Europe doit prendre en main sa propre sécurité, qui ne peut pas dépendre des résultats d’élections chez nos alliés tous les 4 ans.

En construisant une véritable Europe de la défense avec une plus grande aptitude à faire face à un conflit de haute intensité – une « defence readiness ».

Nous devons investir plus, mieux et ensemble, en Européens.

Et avec le retour d’un conflit à haute intensité, nous devons produire plus, plus vite et ensemble.

C’est tout le sens de la stratégie industrielle de défense que nous présentons aujourd’hui. Il s’agit de passer d’une période marquée par les dividendes de la paix à un mode « économie de guerre » pour cette industrie.

Nous ne partons pas d’une feuille blanche.

Depuis 2017, nous avons commencé à mobiliser le budget européen pour soutenir la Recherche et Développement (au travers du Fonds Européen de Défense).

Et pour répondre à l’urgence de la guerre en Ukraine, nous avons soutenu grâce au budget de l’Union, d’abord l’acquisition conjointe avec EDIRPA et ensuite les capacités de production industrielles dans les munitions avec ASAP.

Ce que nous avons démontré avec les munitions, c’est qu’avec une ambition collective, et des moyens au niveau européen, nous sommes capables de développer rapidement notre base industrielle productive.

En moins de 10 mois, nous avons remonté notre capacité de production de munitions d’artillerie à 1 m d’obus chargés par an. Et nous la passerons à 2 m d’ici à 2025.

Il n’y a pas de fatalité ! Et c’est d’ailleurs ça le travail du Commissaire à la défense qui est devant vous : cartographier les capacités, résoudre les goulets d’étranglement, et soutenir les efforts de montée en cadence.

Nous le faisons dans les munitions d’artillerie, nous devons désormais le faire sur l’ensemble des équipements nécessaires à notre sécurité.

Il faut donc pérenniser les efforts faits dans l’urgence au-delà de 2025 et faire le pont pour aller jusqu’au prochain cadre financier en 2027, et les étendre au-delà des munitions à l’ensemble des équipements de défense.

Car la disponibilité des équipements européens de défense devient désormais un enjeu de compétitivité et de sécurité.

Cela veut dire aussi que l’industrie européenne de défense doit prendre plus de risques, et nous les accompagnerons pour leur donner plus de visibilité.

Je souhaiterais ici évoquer deux points importants dans cette nouvelle initiative :

D’abord, le nouveau programme industriel de défense. Il assure la continuité des actions prévues dans EDIRPA et ASAP.  Mais il va au-delà.

Nous intégrons pleinement la base industrielle de défense de l’Ukraine à la base européenne. Les industries Ukrainiennes seront éligibles aux mêmes activités que l’industrie européenne et nous pourrons soutenir les coopérations entre l’Ukraine et l’Union. C’est un signal très fort.

Par ailleurs nous testons de nouvelles formes de soutien :

  • Le financement de sites industriels maintenus prêts à l’emploi (ever warm) afin de raccourcir les temps de montée en cadence.
  • La mise en place d’un mécanisme européen de ventes militaires s’inspirant largement du mécanisme américain US Foreign Military Sale, et qui permettra le financement de réserves stratégiques européennes, gérées par les États membres. L’objectif ici est de permettre d’accroitre la disponibilité des équipements de défense européens et ainsi rétablir une concurrence loyale notamment dans les contrats entre gouvernements.
  • La création d’un Fonds de garantie pour des prêts bonifiés mis à la disposition des PMEs de défense active tout au long des chaines industrielles.

Nous proposons la mise en place d’objectifs ambitieux pour 2030 : Acquérir ensemble 40% des équipements militaires, en transfrontalier au moins 35% et à 50% dans l’Union (60% en 2035).

Pour une Europe de la défense crédible, nous devons aussi avoir une ambition budgétaire adéquate.

Le programme que nous proposons aujourd’hui est doté de €1.5mds, sur mi-2025/fin 2027) mobilisable pour le soutien à l’industrie européenne de défense.

Pour le soutien à l’industrie ukrainienne de défense, un top-up est envisagé en utilisant une partie des intérêts dégagés par les avoir russes gelés. Cette discussion est en cours. Et il faudra l’accord unanime des États Membres. Mais j’ai confiance que nous saurons trouver les solutions pour ancrer la base industrielle de défense ukrainienne à notre marché intérieur.

Au-delà, comme nous le savons, le budget européen aujourd’hui est contraint, et les perspectives de financements futurs (après 2027) sont trop lointaines.

Or l’urgence est là.

Pour ma part, je l’ai déjà dit, je considère que nous devrions – comme nous avons su le faire dans la période du COVID face à une menace existentielle – envisager un investissement commun ad-hoc pour l’industrie de la défense.

Pour avancer sur ce point, il faut évaluer les besoins – en nature et en coûts – et présenter des options de financement. C’est le débat que nous lançons aujourd’hui.

Après le soutien par plusieurs leaders européens [Macron, Kallas, De Croo] sur cette question qui monte, la Commission ne pouvait rester silencieuse.

Par ailleurs, au-delà de l’investissement public, nous devons mobiliser l’investissement privé. L’industrie de la défense doit pouvoir bénéficier d’un accès au financement.

À ce titre, nous demandons avec insistance à la BEI de modifier sa politique afin de permettre un soutien aux industries de défense – au-delà de l’usage dual – afin d’accompagner la montée en cadence de production. Tout le monde doit s’adapter aux nouvelles réalités. Le temps n’est plus à la temporisation, mais à l’action.

L’Europe de la défense est en marche. Et c’est une chance.

Pour la compétitivité de notre industrie.

Pour la crédibilité du pilier européen au sein de l’OTAN.

Pour la sécurité de nos concitoyens.

Source – EU Commission

 


Statements Der EU-Abgeordneten Caspary (CDU) und Niebler (CSU) zu Strategie und Investitionsprogramm für die europäische Verteidigungsindustrie

Die EU-Kommission veröffentlicht heute eine Strategie und ein Investitionsprogramm zur Stärkung der Europäischen Verteidigungsindustrie (“European Defence Industrial Strategy” und “European Defence Investment Programme”). Dazu erklären:

Daniel Caspary (CDU), Vorsitzender der CDU/CSU-Gruppe im Europäischen Parlament:

“Der russische Angriff auf die Ukraine und seine Folgen zeigen uns leider tagtäglich, dass wir unsere Verteidigungsfähigkeit in den letzten Jahren vernachlässigt haben. Das systematische Verfehlen des 2%-Ziels der NATO durch Deutschland und andere Mitgliedstaaten ist dabei symptomatisch. Die heute vorgestellte Initiative der EU-Kommission ist ein wichtiger Schritt in die richtige Richtung: Rund 80% der europäischen Rüstungsausgaben gehen an Hersteller außerhalb Europas. Zu oft wird Rüstung nur national gedacht, zu viel ungenutztes Potential liegt in gemeinsamer europäischer Beschaffung. Ursula von der Leyen hat es vergangene Woche in Straßburg richtig ausgedrückt: wir müssen im Verteidigungssektor nicht nur mehr Geld ausgeben, sondern dieses besser und europäischer verwenden als bislang. Wir müssen mehr in unsere Sicherheit investieren und dabei gleichzeitig Arbeitsplätze in Europa in diesem Bereich schaffen!”

Angelika Niebler (CSU), Co-Vorsitzende der CDU/CSU-Gruppe und Vorsitzende der CSU-Europagruppe:

“Ohne leistungsfähige Rüstungsindustrie gibt es kein wehrhaftes und verteidigungsbereites Europa. Und auch die notwendige Unterstützung der Ukraine stößt sonst an Grenzen. Es ist deshalb folgerichtig, unsere Verteidigungsindustrie strategischer und auch europäischer zu fördern. Die Richtung stimmt, auch wenn es in der Natur der Sache liegt, dass nicht alle Inhalte bei den Mitgliedstaaten Jubelstürme auslösen werden. Mehr Mittel für Verteidigung, mehr Koordinierung untereinander um zielgerichteter zu investieren, ist eine logische Maßgabe.  Bei Investitionen in die Verteidigung sollte man immer auch andere positive Effekte für Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft nicht außer Acht lassen, die daraus entstehen können. Internet, GPS oder die Mikrowelle waren ursprünglich militärische Entwicklungen. Es geht bei weitem nicht nur um Panzer, Bomben und Munition, auch wenn diese bei den aktuellen Herausforderungen natürlich im Mittelpunkt stehen.”

Quelle – EVP/CDU/CSU via E-Mail

 


Renew Europe: New EU defence industrial package is an important step to build a safer Europe

The Renew Europe Group in the European Parliament welcomes today’s adoption by the European Commission of a defence industrial strategy and defence industry programme, intended to support the competitiveness and readiness of the block’s defence industry.

Since Russia started its war of aggression against Ukraine, our political group has been consistently calling for a strong and comprehensive EU strategy on defence, adapted to the current security context.

Some of our proposed measures, such as increased EU and national spending, new forms of financing our defence industry to build security and resilience, cooperation with like-minded international partners have been included in the Commission’s package, but the EU must be bolder in its actions and go for a true Defence Single Market.

Renew Europe MEP, Nathalie Loiseau (Horizons, France), Chair of the Subcommittee on Security and Defence, said:

“The presentation of a defence investment strategy shows that the European Commission is starting to take defence issues seriously. This is one more step towards the necessary rearmament of Europe. But its effects will only be felt in the medium term. We still need to fully respond to the urgency of increasing our military support for Ukraine, which is essential to the security of Europe.”

Ending unanimity in EU foreign policy decision and a more responsive, agile and effective Europe when it comes to mobilisation of resources to face urgent security challenges are essential. As is developing EU’s capacity to fight effectively against the increasing hybrid attacks and Member States’ coordination in this field.

 

Forward to your friends