Sat. Nov 14th, 2026

EU defence ministers prioritise Ukraine air defence and strengthen readiness

Sep 29, 2026 , , , , , , , , ,

Brussels, 28 September 2028

EU defence ministers put Ukraine’s air defence at the centre of their meeting, reviewing €28.3bn in procurement plans and the distribution of €6.6bn under the European Peace Facility. They extended EUMAM Ukraine for two years, discussed Russia’s shadow fleet and hybrid threats, called for more assets for Operation ASPIDES and advanced work on EU defence readiness.

The Foreign Affairs Council with defence ministers took place in Brussels and was chaired by the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Kaja Kallas.

EU support to Ukraine

EU defence ministers discussed EU military support to Ukraine, against the background of the latest developments on the ground and ongoing diplomatic efforts to reach a just and lasting peace backed by robust security guarantees.

EU ministers were joined by the Minister of Defence of Ukraine, Evgeniy Khmara, via VTC for an informal exchange. The Ukrainian minister presented the most urgent battlefield and financial needs and perspectives on advancing cooperation and integrating Ukrainian companies into the European defence technological and industrial base.

The ensuing ministerial discussion focused on air defence, the European Peace Facility (EPF), the EU Military Assistance Mission (EUMAM) Ukraine, and Russia’s shadow fleet.

Air defence remains the key priority for Ukraine. We see the attacks every day. Ukraine’s defence minister, Khmara, made this very clear again.

Kaja Kallas,High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy

Ministers took stock of efforts to strengthen Ukraine’s air defence capabilities. The High Representative recalled that procurement plans worth €28.3 billion have already been approved under the Ukraine Support Loan, including the future purchase of Patriot missiles. Ministers also highlighted the need for immediate deliveries from existing stocks and a ramp-up of production capacities.

The Council recently agreed on the mobilisation of €6.6 billion under the European Peace Facility for military support to Ukraine. The High Representative underlined that the EPF remains one of the EU’s central instruments for supporting Ukraine and announced discussions with member states on replenishing the facility beyond its current funding cycle.

On military training, ministers agreed the first step of the strategic review of EUMAM Ukraine, extending the mission’s mandate for another two years. The mission will also establish a coordination cell in Kyiv to strengthen military education and facilitate the exchange of battlefield lessons.

Finally, the High Representative updated the ministers on the naval CSDP efforts to counter the activities of Russia’s shadow fleet, including flag verification boardings of suspicious vessels.

Current affairs

The Council exchanged views on the situation in the Middle East and its implications for European defence and security, including freedom of navigation, Russia’s escalating hybrid campaign, and the upcoming review of the defence procurement directive.

On freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, as well as in the Red Sea, EU defence ministers took stock of different diplomatic initiatives. Furthermore, the High Representative provided an update on Operation EUNAVFOR ASPIDES and the need for additional national assets to ensure the Operation can effectively support freedom of navigation across Bab-el-Mandeb.

Ministers also expressed growing concerns over Russia’s escalating hybrid campaign, aimed at weakening European unity and solidarity. The discussion focused on EU-level response options, including the recently announced emergency security protocol, continued coordination with NATO where appropriate, and enhancing relevant instruments at the EU’s disposal.

Russia’s sustained acts of sabotage, arson and airspace violations persist. On the EU side, sanctions against perpetrators and the expulsion of Russian diplomats bite, but we need to look into what more we can do.

Kaja Kallas,High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy

The Commission provided an update on the work towards the revision of the defence procurement directive. The meeting was an opportunity for ministers to provide further guidance to the Commission.

Any other business and other decisions

Under ‘other business’, Denmark provided an update on Greenland in the light of the latest developments, including the agreement recently sealed between Denmark, Greenland and the United States to amend and supplement the 1951 Defence Agreement.

The Council approved the first five European defence projects of common interest under the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP):

The Council also decided to renew the mandates of the EU Border Assistance Mission for the Rafah Crossing Point (EUBAM Rafah) and of the EU Police Mission in the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS) for nine months until 30 June 2027:

Ministers adopted a second bilateral assistance measure worth €60 million under the EPF in support of the armed forces of Cabo Verde:

The Council also decided to strengthen the EU Space Threat Response Architecture to respond to increased irresponsible and hostile behaviour in the space domain:

On the same day, the Council decided to sanction a further 10 individuals and 17 entities over the systematic unlawful deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia, as well as to impose restrictive measures on 10 Russian individuals over the barring of the Yabloko opposition party from the State Duma elections:

In the margins of the meeting

Before the beginning of today’s FAC Defence meeting, the European Defence Agency (EDA) Steering Board – convened at ministerial level – welcomed and exchanged views on the first annual defence readiness report, prepared by the EDA ahead of the European Council meeting of 15-16 October. The Board also approved the first phase of the strengthening of the Agency, building on a phased approach presented in May 2026.

Europe needs a decisive change in the scale and pace of defence investment, capability development, innovation and industrial capacity.

Kaja Kallas,High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy

Meeting files
Outcome documents
Press releases

Source – EU Council

 

Press remarks by High Representative Kaja Kallas upon arrival

Brussels, 28 September 2028

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We start the week with the Defence Ministers’ meeting.

First, we have the European Defence Agency Steering Board, where we discuss the EU defence readiness report. As you recall, this was required by the leaders to present such a report. What it shows? It shows the things that we have already done. We have done a lot. The investment in defence has increased, but at the same time, we have big defence capability gaps, and now we should focus on how we actually fill those gaps.

Then we discuss our support to Ukraine. As you have seen, there have been attacks again on civilians. So, Ukraine urgently needs air defence. We are making this plea again that those who have them in stock – how they can give it to Ukraine, so that the Patriot missiles that are produced then later on will be filling their stocks. Clearly, now we have the EPF finally unblocked. There is also the [€] 1 billion that goes to joint procurement because we really need to push Member States to work together. Also, those Member States who have funds to receive, many have already declared that they will give it to Ukraine.

And then we will also discuss situation in the Middle East, especially our naval operations in the region. We have Operation ASPIDES, but it really requires more naval assets to be operational. The need is bigger than it is ever been. We have a lot of requests for escorting the ships, but we need naval assets that can also do that.

Q&A

[inaudible]

Yes, we will discuss the hybrid attacks in the EU and actually the broader strategy against the hybrid attacks. We will propose also the emergency [security] protocol. So, everything that is under the threshold of armed aggression, how we can operate together with the European Commission, Member States, as well as the External Action Service. What are the tools that we can use on different levels? We will propose that, and we will also discuss that.

One way to support Ukraine is also to increase pressure on Russia. Just last week the EU delisted two oligarchs from the sanctions list. How does that [inaudible]? Does this create a dangerous precedent?

It is regrettable that it was the decision, but we need to work on that and actually concentrate on the positive side, which is that 2,998 sanctioned people will be sanctioned for three years, and now it is the opposite. So, to get them out, you need everybody on board, not that extension would require everybody’s approval. So let us focus on that, and we definitely need to increase the pressure, like you say. We are putting forward more listings targeting their military-industrial complex, also targeting their finances of Russia because we want this war to stop.

[inaudible]

Yes, we are working on the listings right now. Everything and everybody that the Member States are proposing, we need to go through whether these are solid cases that we can also propose that they will be held up in court if they are scrutinised. So that is why it takes time.

[inaudible] What is the state of play of this operation? What do you need? [inaudible]

We are, of course, working closely together. We are applying for observer status in this Saudi-led coalition. When it comes to Operation ASPIDES, then we need different types of ships, but we mostly need the ships that are able to escort the ships through the Bab-el-Mandeb. These are different ships. Now, the question is there are many ships that have been also offered to this Coalition of the Willing that is not really operational at the moment. So, my question is whether these ships can be put to the Operation of ASPIDES that is fully operational now, so that later on when this other Coalition of the Willing becomes operational, they can move there. But right now we have the need there, so we will discuss this.

[inaudible] Following the US military withdrawal from Iraq [inaudible]

Definitely, everything is very much connected in the Middle East, and what is happening in Iraq is very well connected to Iran and the threats coming from there. So, we need to look at it all together.

Have you received any specific indications from Member States that they will make concrete pledges for ships in the coming days? And how many specifically do you want?

When Operation ASPIDES was established, then it was said that it has to have at least ten ships. Right now, it does not have these ten ships. No, I do not have concrete commitments, but I am pushing. So maybe there will be some that are announced today.

High Representative, can you please give your honest opinion: is Europe prepared if there is an attack tomorrow by Russia? And we have heard some reports that secret services are saying that it is an ongoing threat and might be a believable scenario. What do you think and can you give us your honest opinion on this?

It is important to understand that we have done more to be more resilient. Member States are spending 2.2 % of their GDP in total for defence, so that is also acting as a deterrent. But we need to be vigilant because we see in the intelligence that Russia is planning more sabotage acts and actually attacks against our democracy to divide our society, to intimidate our societies from refraining to help Ukraine. So, this is something that they have in mind, and we have to keep this in mind as well to be standing up to these threats. Also, when we have intelligence, to be already able to react before these attacks have actually taken place.

What about US weapons, High Representative? You say that Ukraine needs more air defence, but it is becoming more and more difficult to access weapons from the US due to delays. How concerned are you about that?

We are concerned of the production in general because everybody needs more air defence. When we look at the Middle East, when we look at Ukraine, it is very clear that everybody needs more, and we do not have that in the stockpiles. Some countries have. That is why also the plea to put these stockpiles into use now and then produce later. Also, the good signals that were there about licensing, also the production elsewhere – I think this is extremely important because the need for air defence is very high.

Have you been briefed on these counter-terrorism arrests in the United Kingdom, very near the American airbase? Because people are saying one line of inquiry may be Iranian or Russian.

Let us wait for British officials to announce the investigation result and then attribute who could be behind.

Have you been in touch with your British counterpart?

Not yet.

Watch the video of the press remarks and Q&As

Source – EEAS

 

Foreign Affairs Council (Defence): Press conference by High Representative Kaja Kallas

Brussels, 28 September 2028

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Good afternoon,

We just concluded a good meeting of European Defence Ministers.

This morning we started with the European Defence Agency steering board and approved also the next phase for strengthening the European Defence Agency.

It allows EDA to increase joint procurement and focus more on defence innovation, as well as helping EU countries develop capabilities together. This is what we are pushing for. We also discussed the first ever annual defence readiness report that provides a comprehensive picture of Europe’s defence readiness. Without pre-empting its content, let me just say that Europe needs to rearm more quickly and more effectively to meet our target of 2030. Europe needs a decisive change in the scale and pace of defence investment, capability development, innovation, and industrial capacity.

On Ukraine, Member States agreed on the distribution of the €6.6 billion European Peace Facility funds. The EPF has been one of the EU’s central lines of assistance. As next step, I am discussing with Member States how to top up the EPF with new money, including after the end of the current EPF cycle.

Air defence remains the key priority for Ukraine. We see the attacks every day. Ukraine’s Defence Minister Khmara made this very clear again.

We have already approved procurement plans worth of €28.3 billion under the Ukraine Support Loan, and these include purchases of Patriot missiles from future U.S. production. However, missile production takes time, and Kyiv needs Patriots now.

One option is for Member States and partners to supply missiles from their own stocks to Ukraine in exchange for later replacements financed by Ukraine Support Loan.

Member States also addressed Ukraine’s financing needs. Many today called for front-loading parts of the €90 billion loan allocated for 2027. Ukraine could also benefit from up to €20 billion of remaining funds under the SAFE defence initiative.

On training, Member States agreed on the first step of strategic review of EUMAM, extending our mission for Ukraine for another two years. We will also move ahead with establishing a coordination cell in Kyiv, focusing on the battlefield lessons and strengthening also military education.

Earlier this year, I proposed financing the modernisation of two training centres in Ukraine, and I also want to thank the Netherlands for its contribution that was announced today that actually closes the gap that we had in financing. With this support and the support of Germany, Ireland, Denmark, and Luxembourg, we can now move on with both sides of these training centres.

To stop Russia’s war, we must further reduce Moscow’s capacity to fund it, including through its shadow fleets. EU naval operation IRINI has now conducted six boardings of suspected vessels in recent months, making it the lead actor in boarding operations. National boarding operations should continue in parallel, and we must coordinate closely. We use the existing legal framework under UNCLOS to inspect and seize vessels.

Russia’s sustained act of sabotage, arson, and airspace violations persist. On the EU side, sanctions against perpetrators and the expulsion of Russian diplomats spiked. But we need to look into what more can we do. Ministers had a first chance to exchange views on the idea of a new emergency security protocol. Such a mechanism would provide a coordination mechanism to respond [to] grey zone attacks and complement Article 42.7 of today. And, of course, to reiterate, this is complementing NATO and providing EU with firmer response to Russia’s hybrid attacks.

Freedom of navigation was also again on the agenda. The Strait of Hormuz, the Bab el-Mandeb, but also the Black Sea are critical maritime choke points whose disruption spreads far beyond these regions. In the Red Sea, Houthi advances have put shipping routes at greater risk, and Operation ASPIDES helps to keep its vital waterway open. But we need to boost its numbers to make it more effective. If we give a mission a task, we must give it the means.

Finally, Ministers formally extended the mandates of EUBAM Rafah and EUPOL COPPS.

We will continue supporting border management, Palestinian policing and justice, because effective institutions are essential for the two-state solution, and these missions help to build them. Thank you.

Watch the video of the press conference

Q&A

First question is on the discussion about Patriot interceptors. You mentioned the possibility to supply from stocks. Did any countries make some pledges? Maybe you may say how many countries of the EU may have some interceptors to give to Ukraine. Any results? The second question is on the European Peace Facility. You said that it is already agreed how to distribute 6.6 billion. We know that 1 billion goes directly to Ukraine needs, but 4.7 will be distributed between countries. How much from this will go to Ukraine? Because not all countries agree to give it back to Ukraine immediately as we need.

On the interceptors, unfortunately, there were no new pledges made today. So, many were pleading for this swap. Let us see what comes out of it. On the EPF, as you know, we now agreed to reimburse the Member States that were waiting already, and then €1 billion goes to joint procurement, and then also some funding goes for the training of Ukrainian soldiers. Now, as for the reimbursements, many countries were already making announcements that everything that they get back, they will contribute to Ukraine. And my call was also to others who have not made this pledge to actually also contribute it back and help Ukraine. But in the end, they can do it on their side because it is a bilateral support in addition to the support that we are giving on the European level.

You just said if we give a mission a task, we need to give it the means. So, from the discussion today on ASPIDES, do you have any indications that Member States are willing to give more means to this mission, and what could we realistically expect? That is question number one. Question number two on the emergency protocol: did you hear sufficient support or enough support today to move forward in that direction or Member States rather hesitant to create something which might be seen as well in some kind of competition or overlap with NATO?

On ASPIDES, two countries were hinting today that they might provide additional vessels. Like I was saying as well, it is not only the number of vessels that is needed, but actually also the quality of vessels. For example, ASPIDES does not have a mine hunting mandate, which means that you need frigates, you need air defence support, you need vessels that can do the escorting of the ships. But yes, two countries were hinting today that they are actually discussing and will come maybe with the decision.

On the emergency protocol discussion. So, one could say that it was the first discussion of it, very initial. So, the conclusion was that we will continue the discussion with the Member States on different levels, ambassadors – the formats that we have here. Clearly, there were some who were saying that we need some kind of mechanism for anything that is under the armed aggression threshold, which is Article 42.7, also for Article 5. But many stress that it has to be absolutely in complementarity with NATO. We do not create anything additional, but this has to work hand in hand.

German Foreign Minister Wadephul has met with Sergei Lavrov at the United Nations, and there are differing assessments of how that meeting went. But certainly, Mr Lavrov came out ridiculing the German side, and Wadephul sort of explained that he had consulted his colleagues on this and evidently concluded that this was the right time to have this kind of conversation. Do you see any value coming out of this meeting, and do you think it was the right time to launch more diplomatic initiatives to Russia?

First, it is clear for everybody that Germany is the biggest supporter from the EU to Ukraine. I also spoke to Minister Wadephul on what he spoke to Minister Lavrov about to really raise the issue of the hybrid attacks and also press Russia to end its war against Ukraine. I think what it shows is that, as you said, Russia making these comments ridiculing, what is interesting or what is important is that there are many countries outside Europe who say that talk to the Russians and then there will be a result. But, these talks show that Russia really is not interested in peace at all. Otherwise, you do not treat your negotiation partner or the partner of meetings this way. So, this is also very clear for everybody. First and foremost, Russia needs to show by stopping the attacks on civilians that they are interested in peace, which they are not, and then they need to talk to Ukraine because it is between Ukraine and Russia. Everybody else can facilitate this process, but in the end, they need to agree.

One more question on ASPIDES. Do you believe that if ASPIDES managed to reach the size you envisage it will need to adapt its current structure and mandate and chain of command? Or is just a question of simply adding more vessels?

No, the mandate and the command structure actually is exactly for this, what is needed, which is escorting the ships out of Bab el-Mandeb. We are also working in close coordination with the Saudi-led coalition, as observant in this coalition, so that there is no overlapping. The current structure allows it. We need more vessels because literally there are commercial ships that are waiting in the queue to receive the escort that we do not have enough frigates that can do that.

I want to go back on the emergency protocol. I am a bit confused because you say it has to work with Article 42.7, and Member States seems to agree on that. But if I remember correctly, in May the EEAS carried out a tabletop exercise on the operationalisation of Article 42.7, and since then nothing. So, before we advance on the protocol, don’t Member States first need to agree on what Article 42.7 applies to, and what scenarios it applies to? Can you give us an update on the operationalisation of 42.7 and how that would work with the emergency protocol?

You are very harsh – ‘then nothing’. That is not true. There was the tabletop exercise, but we also did the different scenarios. We mapped all the different tools that are in the toolbox of the External Action Service and the Commission’s toolbox that can be used for this case. So, again, we need to keep in mind that the majority of EU Member States that are also member states of NATO, where you have Article 5 and clear protocols how that works. Now, that is why in the scenarios we also had this idea of what is it, if it is under the threshold of armed aggression? What if it is against the country that is not party to NATO? And that is why the President of the Commission came up with the emergency protocol in the State of the Union speech, and now we need to work with that. So, today was a very initial discussion, which means that we take this forward. How these tools that we have in our toolbox would all work together when it is clearly under the threshold of armed aggression.

Just at 10 o’clock, there was a demonstration of Ukrainians with a demand, and they were trying to bring attention to the town of Oleshky, which was blocked for quite a long time. And people over there are under the danger of dying from hunger. There was some humanitarian help dropped by drones just yesterday, but still the city is blocked, and people cannot get out from there. Are there any means on your side to improve the situation? Maybe some sanctions are prepared. Are you aware of it?

Yes, of course, we are preparing the largest listing of sanctions, but it also clearly shows what happens to the people in the occupied territories. When somebody says, “Why don’t they just give up the territories?”. It sounds so easy, right? But it is actually about the people that will suffer in these territories. Of course, we are trying to get the humanitarian aid in, and we are trying to help Ukraine to defend itself and its people, so that these kind of things will not happen. But I think this is also a reminder to all of us that it is not about land – it is about people.

I am a little bit confused on this emergency protocol. Would you say that there is a majority of Member States that want to go ahead with this or a majority of Member States that are part of NATO and are just saying NATO is the right place to deal with even if it is under the threshold of Article 5?

We had the first discussion on this today. Not everybody spoke on this topic, so I do not have an answer to whether it is majority or not majority. Many were saying that they need to know what is there, so to understand whether they support this or not. So, basically, we need to provide concrete answers to Member States and work closely with the Member States on this. Not come up with something that they do not possibly agree, but it is too early to tell right now.

On the emergency security protocol, you talk about some Member States stressing that they do not want to see duplication with NATO, but have you had a conversation with NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte about how this won’t occur? Because from the outset, it looks like this is Article 4, and this is what the Commission President has stated in her speech as well. So, if you can give us the inside track on the conversations with Mark Rutte, that would be great, if possible.

Yes, I have been having the discussion with [the] Secretary General regarding the 42.7 when we were preparing the exercises as well as when we were preparing the papers of the different scenarios. Then we were very much in contact so that there is no duplication, and it is also very clear. We need to work also regarding the emergency protocol because there should not be any duplication. That is what everybody is saying, and what we do not want to create as well. When you talk about Article 4 in NATO, then Article 4 in NATO is just consultations. It is not any kind of action plan. Article 5 is very clear, but Article 4 is discussions that take place. So, the emergency protocol is rather which tools can be used at the moment of aggression that is not armed aggression that is under the threshold of Article 5 and what Member States could do.

Source – EEAS

 

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