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Brussels, 25 February 2023

The Commission welcomes the Council’s adoption of a 10thpackage of sanctions against Russia and those that support it in its illegal aggression against Ukraine. 24 February marks one year since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and 9 years since the beginning of Russia’s illegal invasion and occupation of Ukrainian territory. This package is turning up the pressure in response to Putin’s brutal war, including viciously targeting civilians and critical infrastructure. In order to further increase the effectiveness of EU sanctions, today’s package contains new listings plus trade and financial sanctions, including further export bans worth more than €11 billion, depriving the Russian economy of critical tech and industrial goods. It also steps up enforcement and anti-circumvention measures, including a new reporting obligation on Russian Central Bank assets.

Specifically, this package contains the following elements:

Additional listings

The EU has added about 120 individuals and entities to our sanction list, including Russian decision-makers, senior government officials and military leaders complicit in the war against Ukraine, as well as proxy authorities installed by Russia in the occupied territories in Ukraine, among others. The list also includes key figures involved in the kidnapping of Ukrainian children to Russia, as well as organisations and individuals, who are polluting the public space with disinformation, adding to the military warfare through information warfare. Measures are also taken against individuals in Iran who are involved in the elaboration of drones and components supporting Russia’s military. In addition, members and supporters of Russia’s Wagner mercenary group and its activities in other countries, such as Mali or Central African Republic, are also targeted.

Additional EU export bans and restrictions

New export restrictions have been introduced onsensitive dual-use and advanced technologiesthat contribute to Russia’s military capabilities and technological enhancement, based on information received from Ukraine, our Member States and our partners. This includes additional electronic components used in Russian weapons systems (drones, missiles, helicopters, other vehicles), as well as bans on specific rare earths and thermal cameras with military applications. Moreover, we are also listing 96 additional entities associated to Russia’s military-industrial complex, bringing the total of military end-users that are listed to 506. This includes Russian entities associated with the Kremlin-controlled Wagner paramilitary organisation. This also includes, for the first time, seven Iranian entities that have been using EU components and providing Russia with military “Shahed” drones to attack civilian infrastructure in Ukraine. Importantly, we are working in close coordination with partners, and are adding Australia, Canada and New Zealand and Norway to the list of our partner countries.

Additional export bans are now also imposed on goods that can be easily redirected to be used to support the Russian war effort including:

  • Vehicles: heavy trucks not yet banned (and their spare parts), semi-trailers, and special vehicles such as snowmobiles;
  • Goods easily directed to the Russian military: including electric generators, binoculars, radars, compass, etc.;
  • Construction goods such as bridges, structures for buildings tower-like, fork-lifts trucks, cranes, etc.;
  • Goods that are critical for the functioning and enhancement of Russian industrial capacity (electronics, machine parts, pumps, machinery for working metals, etc.);
  • Complete industrial plants: this category has been added to avoid loopholes;
  • Goods used in the aviation industry (turbojets).

These new bansand restrictions cover EU exports worth EUR 11.4 billion (2021 data). They come on top of the €32.5 billion worth of exports already sanctioned in the previous packages. With today’s package, the EU has sanctioned in total nearly close to half (49%) of its 2021 exports to Russia.

Additional imports bans into the EU

Today’s package imposesimport banson the following Russian high-revenue goods:

  • Bitumen and related materials like asphalt;  and
  • Synthetic rubber and carbon blacks.

These new import bans cover EU imports worth almost EUR 1.3 billion and they come on top of €90 billion already sanctioned, representing altogether 58% of the EU’s 2021 imports.

Financial sector

Three Russian banks have been added to the list of entities subject to the asset freeze and the prohibition to make funds and economic resources available.

Other measures include the following:
  • A ban on Russian nationals from serving on governing bodies of Member States’ critical infrastructure companies;
  • Prohibition on Russian nationals and entities to book gas storage capacity in the Union (LNG excluded);
  • Measures to facilitate the divestment from Russia by EU operators;

A third country shipping company, suspected of helping Russia circumvent sanctions on oil exports, has also been listed.

Enforcement and anti-circumvention measures

Today’s package imposes new reporting obligations on Russian Central Bank assets. This is especially important regarding the possible use of public Russian assets to fund the reconstruction of Ukraine after Russia is defeated.

Other measures include the following:

  • reporting obligations on frozen assets (including for dealings before listings) and assets which should be frozen;
  • Private flights between the EU and Russia, directly or via third countries, should be notified in advance;
  • Prohibition to transit dual use goods and firearms via the territory of Russia to third countries.

In addition to today’s package, the EU sanctions envoy David O’Sullivan is reaching out to third countries, to ensure strict implementation of sanctions and prevent circumvention. On 23 February, the first Sanctions Coordinators Forum took place in Brussels, gathering our international partners and Member States, to strengthen enforcement efforts.

Additional bans on Russian disinformation outlets

Two additional Russian media outlets have been added to the media ban.

Technical amendments
  • Amendment to allow the provision of pilot services necessary for maritime safety ;
  •  Definition of the term “import” to avoid goods being “stranded” in long customs procedures;
Background

The EU’s sanctions against Russia are proving effective. They are limiting Russia’s ability to wage the war against Ukraine, including to manufacture new weapons and repair existing ones, as well as hinder its transport of material.

The geopolitical, economic, and financial implications of Russia’s continued war of aggression against Ukraine are clear, as the war has disrupted global commodities markets, especially for agrifood products and energy. The EU continues to ensure that its sanctions do not impact energy and agrifood exports from Russia to third countries.

As guardian of the EU Treaties, the European Commission monitors the enforcement of EU sanctions across the EU.

The EU stands united in its solidarity with Ukraine, and will continue to support Ukraine and its people together with its international partners, including through additional political, financial, military and humanitarian support for as long as necessary.

More information

Questions and answers on the 10th package of sanctions against Russia

European Commission website on EU sanctions against Russia and Belarus

European Commission website on Ukraine

Q&A on restrictive measures

 


Questions and Answers: tenth package of restrictive measures against Russia

 

Listings

Who have you targeted?

120 individuals and 96 entities added to the sanctions list, including Russian decision-makers, senior government officials, military leaders complicit in the war against Ukraine, as well as proxy authorities installed by Russia in the occupied territories in Ukraine, amongst others. The list also includes key figures involved in the kidnapping of Ukrainian children to Russia, as well as organisations and individuals who are polluting the public space with disinformation, adding to the military warfare through information warfare.

Measures are also taken against individuals in Iran who are involved in the elaboration of drones and components supporting Russia’s military. In addition, members and supporters of Russia’s Wagner mercenary group and its activities in other countries, such as Mali or Central African Republic, are also targeted.

Financial sector

Three additional Russian banks have been sanctioned (asset freeze). The listing has a deep impact on the day-to-day business of listed banks, cutting them off from the EU economy and financial system.

Critical infrastructure, gas storage

Why have you imposed a ban on Russian nationals serving on boards of critical infrastructure companies in the EU, such as electricity grids or gas providers?

Critical infrastructures and entities are providers of essential services. Having Russian nationals in governing bodies of such entities may threaten their well-functioning and the security/safety of EU citizens, as well as the security interests of the EU.

Why have you banned Russian nationals and entities from booking gas capacity in gas storages in the EU?

EU gas storage plays a key role in ensuring the energy supply of the EU. This measure aims at countering the Russia’s weaponisation of its gas supply and to avoid risks of market manipulation by Russian operators that would be detrimental to the critical energy supply of the Union. LNG is explicitly excluded from this measure.

Import and export restrictions

What new import and export restrictions have been introduced?

With the 10th package of sanctions against Russia, we have introduced new measures concerning both export (value of export bans EUR 11.4 billion) and import (value of import bans EUR 1.3 billion).

On the export side, we have continued to target goods and technologies particularly relevant for the Russian military and industrial complex and, on the import side, goods that generate significant revenue for Russia.

Additional trade bans on imports into the EU of Russian synthetic rubber and asphalt or bitumen (an oil product) and on exports into Russia of EU industrial goods and goods that can be easily redirected to be used to support the Russian war effort including trucks, other heavy vehicles, construction machines, pumps and other machines used in the construction sector.

The package also includes additional export restrictions on sensitive dual-use and advanced technology items that could contribute to Russia’s military capabilities and technological enhancement, based on information retrieved from Russian military systems on the battlefield. Moreover, we are also listing 96 additional entities associated to Russia’s military-industrial complex, bringing the total of military end-users that are listed to 506. This includes for the first time seven Iranian entities that have been using EU components and providing Russia with military “Shahed” drones to attack civilian infrastructure in Ukraine. This should act as a strong deterrent to other companies and international traders that circumvention of export restrictions will not be tolerated. Importantly, we are working in close coordination with partners and are adding Australia, Canada and New Zealand and Norway to the list of our partner countries.

A third country shipping company, suspected of helping Russia circumvent sanctions on oil exports, has also been listed.

What other trade-related measures are included in this package?

Furthermore, a new full export ban is placed on turbojets and their parts, therefore reinforcing the existing ban on aircrafts, their engines and parts.

Anti-circumvention measures

We have introduced a transit ban for dual-use goods and advanced technology and firearms via the Russian territory. This means that goods can no longer transit via the territory of Russia when exported to third countries.

Disinformation

Why has the EU added further outlets to the sanctions list?

We have added Arab language subsidiaries of RT (Russia Today) and Sputnik because they are Russian state-owned and/or under the Kremlin’s influence and they disseminate disinformation and war propaganda of the sanctioned regime, aiding Russia’s war efforts.

Clarifications

Which clarifications did the EU introduce?

We have clarified when and under which conditions, goods can be considered as imported into the Union when such goods were physically in the Union and already presented to customs authorities when they become subject to import restrictions. Such a clarification was necessary for Union operators which brought those goods into the Union in good faith at a time when they were not yet subject to any import restrictive measures.

Reporting obligations

What reporting obligations have been proposed and why?

The new measures introduced the following changes to the reporting obligations:

  • In Regulation 269/2014 (asset freeze), more detailed reporting obligations on frozen assets (including for dealings before listings) and assets which should be frozen. Operators are required to report this information to Member States, which in turn are required to report it to the Commission.

Central securities depositories report to Member States and also directly to the Commission to streamline the reporting process at EU-level.

These changes, including further details on what information should be provided, are aimed at ensuring a uniform application of the asset freeze provisions.

  • In Regulation 833/2014 (sectoral sanctions), new reporting obligations for the operators to the Member States and the Commission on assets and reserves of the Central Bank of Russia, which they hold or control or are a counterparty to.

These changes are aimed at ensuring a uniform application of the prohibition of transactions related to the management of reserves and assets of the Central Bank of Russia.

Under the new provisions, Member States and EU operators will have to cooperate with the Commission in the verification of the information provided and the Commission may request any additional information.

General

What is the rationale of imposing such sanctions?

Sanctions are targeted at the Kremlin. They aim to weaken the Russian government’s ability to finance its war of aggression against Ukraine and are calibrated in order to minimise the negative consequences on the Russian population.

Sanctions are imposing a direct cost on Russia for its war of aggression and damaging Russia’s industrial and economic ability to wage war, manufacture more weapons, and repair existing weapons systems. The sanctions also deprive the Russian army and its suppliers of the goods and equipment needed to wage its war against Ukraine.

In addition, sanctions are designed to maximise the negative impact for the Russian economy, while limiting the consequences for EU businesses and citizens. We welcome EU companies’ diligence in complying with the sanctions framework in place.

Ensuring an effective and diligent implementation of sanctions is key to prevent circumvention. This is primarily the responsibility of Member States.

In this process, the European Commission is fully committed to assisting them and ensuring a consistent implementation across the Union.

Are EU sanctions aggravating the global food crisis?

No. It is Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine and Russia’s deliberate actions – such as limiting grain exports from Ukraine, burning crops and silos, stealing Ukrainian cereals, and complicating trade – that is provoking a global food crisis.

None of the EU’s sanctions adopted against Russia prevent the supply of agri-food, medical equipment or medicines for the general population. Agricultural machinery per se is also not subject to any export ban.

None of the sanctions adopted by the EU in view of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine target the trade in agricultural and food products, including cereals and fertilisers, between third countries and Russia.

Available data from the UN indicate that the Russian exports of grains and fertilisers in 2022 remained quite stable compared with previous years.

If third countries wish to buy Russian fertilisers, there are no EU sanctions that would prohibit this.

On 19 September 2022, the EU issued updated guidance to clarify the situation in which EU operators transport a sanctioned item to a third country. It makes it clear that the transfer of Russian fertilisers to third countries via the EU is permitted. Given the food security concerns in certain third countries, the 9th package of sanctions introduced a targeted derogation allowing Member States to unfreeze assets of, and to make funds and economic resources available to, certain individuals who held a prominent significant role in international trade in agricultural and food products, including wheat and fertilisers, prior to their listing.

More information

Press release: EU agrees 10th package of sanctions against Russia 

Official Journal

European Commission website on Ukraine

Q&A on restrictive measures

 

 

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