Today, the European Commission and the High Representative adopted a Joint Communication on the state of play of EU-Türkiye political, economic and trade relations, following up to the task set out by the European Council of 29-30 June 2023.
The Joint Communication builds on and updates the Joint Communication submitted by the Commission and the High Representative to the European Council in March 2021. It outlines the state of play of EU-Türkiye relations in key areas and sets out recommendations, aiming to advance relations in a strategic and forward-looking manner, in the current fast-changing, geopolitical and security environment.
The EU retains a strategic interest in a stable and secure environment in the Eastern Mediterranean and in the development of a cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship with Türkiye. To pursue these endeavours, in line with the March 2021 Joint Communication and European Council Conclusions, the European Commission and the High Representative recommend making additional steps towards constructive engagement on key areas of cooperation, in a progressive, proportionate, and reversible manner, and on the basis of the established conditionality by the European Council, while remaining determined to use the instruments and options at the EU’s disposal to defend the interests of EU and its Member States.
Following the adoption by the College, the report will now be submitted to the European Council for consideration and guidance.
On 8 November, the Commission published the 2023 Communication on Enlargement Policy and its regular country report on Türkiye, reflecting the state of play in the accession process.
For More Information
Joint Communication on the state of play of EU-Türkiye political, economic and trade relations
Press remarks by High Representative Borrell and Commissioner Várhelyi on the state of play of EU-Türkiye political, economic and trade relations
Brussels, 29 November 2023
“Check against delivery”
Opening remarks by High Representative Josep Borrell
We are here today to present the Joint Communication on the state of play of our political, economic and trade relations with Türkiye that the College has just adopted right now.
With this report, I – as High Representative – and the [European] Commission will answer the request by the European Council – the European Union Leaders – that requested us to map out where we are in our relations with Türkiye and suggest how we want to shape it in a strategic and forward-looking manner.
For us, Türkiye is a very important partner, and this first assessment was already done in Spring 2021 – when we were in a turbulent period in our relations.
It is clear that there have been difficulties in the past, such as the dynamics in the Eastern Mediterranean, bilateral relations with some of our Member States, and trade irritants. But we have seen a more constructive attitude on these points although there are still open issues, which we need to address together and certainly, this includes – in a relevant position – the Cyprus issue.
We are living in an increasingly complex and challenging geopolitical context, and the need for the European Union to strengthen its security, has a profound impact on the EU-Türkiye relations. I think that we are interested in developing a mutually beneficial partnership with Türkiye – an important neighbour, as I said, a key partner and do not forget it, a European Union candidate country – although the accession track with Türkiye remains at a standstill. This report has nothing to do with that, it is about the broad approach to Türkiye apart from its [EU] candidacy.
Against this background and faced with a need to pursue our interests more effectively, the European union needs to consider which are the next steps in the EU-Türkiye relations.
In this context, we have identified a number of possible options towards engagement with Türkiye in a phased, proportionate and reversible manner. Phased, proportionate and reversible manner.
These steps are subject to the established conditionalities already set out by the European Council in June and March 2021.
Our report makes also clear the two-tracks approach suggested by the March 2021 Communication, that was welcomed by the European Union leaders, and it still remains valid.
We reaffirm our determination to use the instruments at our disposal to defend the interests of the EU and our Member States, as well as to uphold regional stability.
Ensuring a stable and secure environment in the Eastern Mediterranean – this is a strategic goal of the European Union.
Engaging with Türkiye, most notably, on the Cyprus issue, but also given the importance of good neighbourhood relations with Greece, is of essence.
Wider regional issues in the Eastern Mediterranean are also calling for a closer European Union engagement with Türkiye and other regional partners, for the much-needed work to turn the dynamics from conflict to cooperation.
In the context of the Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, Türkiye’s role in the Black Sea, as a NATO ally, is also key.
Implementation of the European Union sanctions against Russia and actively combatting efforts of circumvention is also of paramount importance in this context.
The proposals in this report suggest continuing and taking more steps towards engaging with Türkiye in areas of mutual interest, such as trade, investments, migration, connectivity, green and digital transition, energy, to name just a few, and also about visa facilitation.
We suggest to resume the High-Level Dialogues and the Association Council that were suspended in 2019 – it means four years ago.
But, at the same time, we are clear with our expectations: maintain the calm in the Eastern Mediterranean and improve its prosperity.
For that, we also suggest making first steps towards the launching of negotiations with Türkiye on the modernisation of Customs Union.
Again, we are clear on what we expect from Türkiye to do for this to happen, namely addressing trade irritants, to cooperate with us on preventing circumvention of sanctions against Russia and creating a climate conducive to the resumption of Cyprus settlement talks.
And finally, the dialogue on the rule of law and fundamental rights will remain an integral part of the European Union-Türkiye relationship and we see that there is room for improvement.
To summarise, the European Union clearly has a strategic interest to develop a mutually beneficial relationship with Türkiye and maintain a stable and secure environment in the Eastern Mediterranean. And this Joint Communication, from the High Representative and the [European] Commission responds to this objective.
It is now for the European Leaders to give further guidance on how we take forward our engagement with Türkiye.
Thank you.
Opening remarks by Commissioner Olivér Varhelyi
I want to continue where the High Representative has just finished, and that is that we need all efforts and we propose all efforts to be taken to bridge the key differences between Ankara and our point of view. We might not see eye to eye everywhere. But certainly there is more that unites us than divides us. We must focus on cooperation, where it is feasible and mutually beneficial.
Türkiye continues to be a candidate country and key partner of the European Union, you have seen our report on that just a couple of weeks ago. Türkiye is a major NATO ally and a strategic partner in a very uneasy neighbourhood and region. We have ever closer people-to-people contacts with millions of tourists, students, businesspeople in both directions. And our economies are almost fully integrated by now with one another.
So we think that there is huge potential in taking the next steps. But of course we need also a constructive attitude from Türkiye to really support the proposals that we are making.
So we are proposing a number of actions to energise the key areas of our cooperation – as it was already mentioned by the High Representative in a progressive, proportionate and reversible manner, and of course in line with all the established conditions and guidelines by the European Council.
So let me walk you through the key recommendations:
First, about intensifying high-level engagement. For instance,
- We are proposing to restart the High-level Dialogues on Economy, Energy and Transport, under the conditions that of course Türkiye means to refrain from all illegal drilling activities in the Eastern Mediterranean and that it continues to respect the sovereignty and sovereign rights of our Member States.
- It is also suggested to resume the work of the Association Council and the High-level Political Dialogues at all ministerial level, and to set up a new High-level Dialogue on Trade.
- These contacts will ensure, will help to deepen mutual understanding, and should also contribute to resolving existing issues and deepen the cooperation.
Second, we are proposing to energise cooperation on trade and connectivity. For example,
- We recommend resuming discussions on the draft negotiating framework for the modernisation of the EU-Türkiye Customs Union – while we should also be working in parallel on the trade irritants also mentioned by the High Representative and also that Türkiye should address any circumvention of our restrictive measures against Russia.
- As you know, Türkiye is our 7thlargest trading partner, and we are the first for Türkiye. This is why bilateral trade has grown more than four-fold and you see that we are also passing this year €200 billion of trade. This is an all-time record.
- So our recommendations is to open the door for even closer economic and trade relations.
Third – as a matter of priority – we are proposing also to explore the Member States to facilitate access to visa applications, and to facilitate the people-to-people contact, in particular for business people and students and this should include issuing multiple entry visas with longer term validities.
Fourth, we are suggesting to boost the public and private investments in Türkiye,
- In particular through the new Türkiye Investment Platform, in key areas of mutual interest such as connectivity, digital, green energy, and transition, transport connections, together with European and International Financial Institutions. We seek to leverage to create investments of the value of €2 billion with our budget guarantees of €317 million.
- And on this occasion we also invite the European Investment Bank to resume its operations across all sectors in Türkiye.
And fifth, on migration, we also suggest a more effective and mutually beneficial implementation of the 2016 EU-Turkey Statement. And to this end, we are also proposing:
- To intensify efforts to stem irregular migration, prevent departures, strengthen border control and crack down on the criminal smuggling and organised crime groups;
- Resume readmissions from the Greek islands, address the migration situation in Cyprus and prevent irregular departures on routes to the EU;
- We would also like to see the stepping up of resettlement from Türkiye to the EU;
- And we also want to support the safe, dignified and voluntary returns to the countries of origin, in close cooperation with IOM and UNHCR if this is requested by Türkiye.
- In this regard, as you know, the Commission has proposed a new strategic assistance package of €4 billion for 2024-2027 as part of the MFF mid-term review, meaning that we would like to continue on the basis of our current arrangements.
We see that the current process of re-engagement is already yielding results – for example in the trade irritants area – so we think that it is essential both for the EU and Türkiye to pursue this agenda in good faith, in a cooperative and mutually beneficial manner.
We look forward to the strategic guidance to be issued by our leaders, and we are convinced that with these balanced and solid recommendations we can pick up the work and we can start to build a new beginning for a positive agenda step by step.
Source – EU Commission
EU-Türkiye: Press remarks by High Representative Josep Borrell after the adoption of the joint report on the state of play of bilateral political, economic and trade relations
Brussels, 29 November 2023
Check against delivery!
We are here today to present the Joint Communication on the state of play of our political, economic and trade relations with Türkiye that the College has just adopted right now.
With this report, I – as High Representative – and the [European] Commission will answer the request by the European Council – the European Union Leaders-that requested us to map out where we are in our relations with Türkiye and suggest how we want to shape it in a strategic andforward-lookingmanner.
For us, Türkiye is a very important partner, and this first assessment was already done in Spring 2021 – when we were in a turbulent period in our relations.
It is clear that there have been difficulties in the past, such as the dynamics in the Eastern Mediterranean, bilateral relations with some of our Member States, and trade irritants. But we have seen a more constructive attitude on these points although there are still open issues, which we need to address together and certainly, this includes – in a relevant position – the Cyprus issue.
We are living in an increasingly complex and challenging geopolitical context, and the need for the European Union to strengthen its security, has a profound impact on the EU-Türkiye relations. I think that we are interested in developing a mutually beneficial partnership with Türkiye – an important neighbour, as I said, a key partner and do not forget it, a European Union candidate country – although the accession track with Türkiye remains at a standstill. This report has nothing to do with that, it is about the broad approach to Türkiye apart from its [EU] candidacy.
Against this background and faced with a need to pursue our interests more effectively, the EuropeanUnion needs to consider which are the next steps in the EU-Türkiye relations.
In this context, we have identified a number of possible options towards engagement with Türkiye in a phased, proportionate and reversible manner. Phased, proportionate and reversible manner.
These steps are subject to the established conditionalities already set out by the European Council in June and March 2021.
Our report makes also clear the two-tracks approach suggested by the March 2021 Communication, that was welcomed by the European Union leaders, and it still remains valid.
We reaffirm our determination to use the instruments at our disposal to defend the interests of the EU and our Member States, as well as to uphold regional stability.
Ensuring a stable and secure environment in the Eastern Mediterranean – this is a strategic goal of the European Union.
Engaging with Türkiye, most notably, on the Cyprus issue, but also given the importance of good neighbourhood relations with Greece, is of essence.
Wider regional issues in the Eastern Mediterranean are also calling for a closer European Union engagement with Türkiye and other regional partners, for the much-needed work to turn the dynamics from conflict to cooperation.
In the context of the Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, Türkiye’s role in the Black Sea, as a NATO ally, is also key.
Implementation of the European Union sanctions against Russia and actively combatting efforts of circumvention is also of paramount importance in this context.
The proposals in this report suggest continuing and taking more steps towards engaging with Türkiye in areas of mutual interest, such as trade, investments, migration, connectivity, green and digital transition, energy, to name just a few, and also about visa facilitation.
We suggest to resume the High-Level Dialogues and the Association Council that were suspended in 2019 – it means four years ago.
But, at the same time, we are clear with our expectations: maintain the calm in the Eastern Mediterranean and improve its prosperity.
For that, we also suggest making first steps towards the launching of negotiations with Türkiye on the modernisation of Customs Union.
Again, we are clear on what we expect from Türkiye to do for this to happen, namely addressing trade irritants, to cooperate with us on preventing circumvention of sanctions against Russia and creating a climate conducive to the resumption of Cyprus settlement talks.
And finally, the dialogue on the rule of law and fundamental rights will remain an integral part of the European Union-Türkiye relationship and we see that there is room for improvement.
To summarise, the European Union clearly has a strategic interest to develop a mutually beneficial relationship with Türkiye and maintain a stable and secure environment in the Eastern Mediterranean. And this Joint Communication, from the High Representative and the [European] Commission responds to this objective.
It is now for the European Leaders to give further guidance on how we take forward our engagement with Türkiye.
Thank you.
Q&A
Q. Mr High Representative, in your opinion, against the background of recent developments. What role can Türkiye play in terms of the Middle East Peace Process?
Türkiye is playing an important role in almost every conflict. We see Türkiye in Libya, we see Türkiye in Somalia. I even see Türkiye engaging on the issue of Venezuela. So, how not, Türkiye can play a role in the Middle East Peace Process. We know its position – strongly supporting the cause of the Palestinians. And we are ready to engage with Türkiye and all relevant actors in the area. We are in discussions with the representatives of the Muslim and Arab world. And we are also ready to discuss with Türkiye which can be the way for political negotiations that could lead to the Two-State solution – which is something that both Türkiye and the European Union support.
Q. Given the EU-Türkiye relations, how do you address the stated positions for a two-state solution with Cyprus, which is something that the European Union is not accepting, as it recognises one country that should be united. Is there any sign from the Turkish side in your contacts that this is a negotiating position or that it is something that can be really problematic in future relations with the European Union?
You know, about Cyprus since Türkiye is pushing for the two-state solution, let me say that on the two-state solution and overall Cyprus issue, the [position of the] European Union has not changed: the European Council recalled in June 2023 that the European Union remains fully committed to a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem, within the United Nations framework, in accordance with the relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions and in line with the principles on which the European Union is founded.
The European Union has called for a speedy resumption of negotiations and is ready to play an active role in supporting all stages of this United Nations-led process with all appropriate means at our disposal. We are really ready to engage, as much as needed. This is not a gift to Türkiye. This serves our most important interests, which is peace and stability in the Eastern Mediterranean. But our position with respect to the Cyprus issue has not changed, since it was clearly stated by the European Council in June 2023.
Q. I would like also, if you could comment, on how do you assess Türkiye’s current position on the two-state solution, whether it can be a real problem when it comes to EU relations [with Türkiye] or whether it is a position that could lead to some discussions further down the line.
You can ask me the same question in different formats, my answer will be the same.
Q. My first question is regarding the 18 pages of report that I had the pleasure to read. I was wondering whether, with this way forward you announce, would EU-Türkiye relations with come to status quo ante 14 December 2021 or not? Bearing in mind that at that time, there was still a visa free regime or other things, whereas now we just discuss about visa facilitation – and it is a very big problem in the context of Türkiye – as well as resuming EIB loans and this kind of issue. My second question is: we have the feeling, when we read the report, that the relations would resume unless Türkiye has rather good relations with not only Greece but [it also] finds a solution to the Cyprus problem or at least have a kind of constructive approach. Is it right or wrong to feel or to have this perception? Regarding immigration and the migration package, will there be also a kind of financial assistance, or will the 2016 agreement be rephrased, reframed? What is the expectation?
I can add [to what Commissioner Varhelyi just said] a broader approach. I think it is important to repeat that we are living in an increasingly complex and challenging geopolitical context. That is a fact of life.
It was not the case in 2021. In 2021, there was not a war in Ukraine, there was not this crisis between Israel and Palestine – just to cite the two most important issues. Maybe, at that time, we were more focusing on what was happening in Libya. But today, we are facing a completely different geopolitical context, and in this context, the European Union has to strengthen its security.
This context, unavoidably, has an impact on our relations with Türkiye. Let me stress one thing: we are very much interested in developing a mutually-beneficial partnership with Türkiye. We recognise Türkiye as an important neighbour, as a key partner for the European Union – not only as a candidate country, as the Commissioner has reminded.
And also, the fact that there are some irritants on several sectorial aspects and some key political issues, which is the case of Cyprus, certainly. But you have a look at this [Joint] Communication, you have to read it in a positive manner, because we want to engage with Türkiye in order to solve all irritant questions and to deal with all problems that have been for years in a kind of stalemate, and a solution has to be reached. The approach will be phased, proportionate and reversible, but with a clear will of improving our relationship and make a new era in our relations based on looking for common solutions to common problems.
Q. High Representative Borrell. First of all, there is an intention for new talks on the Customs Union issue, however, with the Cyprus issue open how could these talks evolve? And second question, I haven’t heard anything in your remarks about the possibility of defence cooperation between the EU and Türkiye. Is the fact that Türkiye is not fully aligned with some key EU foreign policy issues like sanctions against Russia play any role in this defence cooperation?
Well, Türkiye is a member of NATO and most of the European Union Member States are members of NATO. Recently, two more have or will become members of NATO. So, the defence cooperation between Türkiye and the Member States of the European Union has a good framework, which is NATO. Yesterday, we had a meeting at the NATO talking about the Western Balkans, this is a nice place to see our cooperation develop. It is important to say that we are doing and having a good cooperation on such issues, which are very important for us, the future of the Western Balkans.
Certainly, there is not a high-level alignment on our foreign policy with Türkiye and we want to organise our exchanges on Foreign Policy, in order to be more effective and operational. It is clear that, in some cases, we will disagree and in other cases, we have to stress the importance of our agreements.
For example, Türkiye and the European Union support the same position on the Two-State solution and our efforts in the Middle East Peace Process. Together we keep engaging as members of the anti-Daesh coalition. We are important partners in the fight against terrorism. Certainly, we disagree with Türkiye on the consideration of Hamas. For us Hamas remains a terrorist organisation, it was declared like this by the European Union many years ago. Türkiye has a different approach and at the same time it is something which is coherent with the position of the Muslim world. And we have said, in several occasions, that the solution of the situation in the Middle East countries cannot only be military, it also has to be political and diplomatic. And we agree with Türkiye on the need to push for the Two-State solution.
In some cases, we disagree, in others, we fully agree. In some cases, we cooperate a lot and in others we expect more and better cooperation, like it is the case on the circumvention of sanctions against Russia. Türkiye has played an important role on this deal, that has been able to allow exports on Ukrainian grain to the rest of the world. Just for that, we have to thank Türkiye authorities. Today, this deal is no longer in place, but Ukraine has found a way of exporting his grain through a maritime corridor, but it does not mean that we do not recognise the important efforts Türkiye has done in the past, when this corridor was not in place in order to make the world being able to receive the grain from Ukraine. So, it is a complex relation. Our foreign policy alignment is very low, and we except to increase it by continuing our foreign policy dialogue.
Link to video:https://audiovisual.ec.europa.eu/en/video/I-249905
Source – EEAS