China condemns new U.S. port fees as protectionist and harmful to global trade

Beijing, 22 April 2025

Chinese state new agency Xinhua (Xinhua) reported on April 22, 2025 that the United States had introduced new trade measures – notably fees – targeting ships that are Chinese-built, Chinese-operated, or Chinese-owned. These measures allegedly aim to counter China’s growing influence in maritime shipping, port logistics, and shipbuilding. This analysis verifies those claims against official U.S. announcements and global shipping data, and checks international bodies’ (IMO, WTO) perspectives on China’s maritime role.

We present findings on three points: (1) U.S. government sources confirming the new fees and restrictions, (2) China’s share of the global cargo shipping market with relevant statistics, and (3) any statements from the International Maritime Organization (IMO) or World Trade Organization (WTO) about China’s shipping role or reactions to the U.S. actions. Finally, we assess the credibility of the Xinhua report in light of factual evidence.

1. U.S. Measures Targeting Chinese Ships – Official Confirmation

Official U.S. sources do confirm the imposition of new fees and trade measures on Chinese-linked maritime activities. On April 17, 2025, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) announced the results of a year-long Section 301 investigation into China’s “targeting of the maritime, logistics, and shipbuilding sectors for dominance.” The USTR determined China’s policies in these sectors to be “unreasonable” and harmful to U.S. commerce, warranting responsive action. According to the USTR press release, the United States will implement these actions in two phases:

• Phase 1 (after a 180-day grace period) – New service fees on vessels that are Chinese-built or operated by Chinese companies, applied per net ton or per container on each U.S. port call. These fees will start at zero for the first 180 days (to avoid immediate disruption) and then phase in incrementally over subsequent years. The fees target:

  • vessel owners/operators from China (for each U.S. voyage, based on tonnage), and

  • operators of ships built in Chinese shipyards (based on tonnage or number of containers), with rates rising over time.

For example, by one detailed report the finalized rule will (after the grace period) charge $50 per net ton on Chinese-built or Chinese-owned ships entering U.S. ports, increasing by $30 each year for three years. Alternatively, such ships will be charged $120 per container unloaded, rising to $250 per container after three years, if that yields a higher fee. In practice, the fee is applied once per voyage (capped at six times annually per vessel). These figures reflect a moderated approach compared to an earlier proposal of up to $1.5 million per port call that had alarmed the shipping industry. USTR Ambassador Jamieson Greer stated the intent is to “reverse Chinese dominance” in shipping and “send a demand signal for U.S.-built ships”.

• Phase 2 (to begin 3 years later) – Additional restrictions to promote U.S.-built vessels in strategic sectors. Notably, the USTR plans to require that a certain percentage of U.S. liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports be carried on U.S.-built and -flagged ships. The mandate starts low (1% of LNG exports on U.S. vessels within 4 years) but would gradually increase to 4% by 2035 and 15% by 2047. This long-term measure is meant to foster a domestic LNG tanker industry. The USTR is also considering 100% tariffs on Chinese-made port equipment like ship-to-shore cranes and intermodal containers, pursuant to a related White House executive order on “Restoring America’s Maritime Dominance”. Public comments were solicited on these equipment tariffs.

These actions were formally outlined in a Federal Register notice and USTR determination. They came in response to a petition from U.S. labor unions alleging that China’s state-backed expansion in shipping and shipbuilding unfairly undercuts U.S. industries. The Department of Commerce was not the lead on this matter; it was driven by USTR under trade law (Section 301 of the Trade Act). However, it’s coordinated across agencies – for instance, the U.S. Maritime Administration and Department of Transportation are involved in related incentives for U.S. shipbuilding (e.g. encouraging new U.S.-built car carriers and LNG ships).

In summary, multiple official U.S. sources confirm the new fees targeting Chinese-built and -operated vessels. The USTR press release (April 17, 2025) and Federal Register notice detail a phased scheme of incremental port fees on Chinese-linked ships. Independent news outlets also reported these measures, noting exemptions and industry backlash. For example, Reuters described that from mid-October 2025 (after the grace period), Chinese-built or Chinese-owned ships will incur fees equating to $50/NT (net ton) or $120/container, with scheduled yearly increases, and certain carve-outs for Great Lakes trade, empty export pickups, and small vessels. These reports leave no doubt that the U.S. has moved to impose new costs on China’s maritime sector, with the aim of bolstering U.S. shipbuilders and reducing reliance on Chinese-made ships.

2. China’s Share of the Global Shipping Market

A key claim in the Xinhua piece is that China’s so-called “dominance” in shipping is overstated, noting that the Chinese commercial fleet accounts for “less than 19%” of global market share (​english.news.cn). We examined the data on Chinese shipping companies’ global market presence, including fleet size, cargo volume, and share of world shipping capacity, to verify this figure.

Fleet Size and Capacity

By several measures, China is indeed one of the top shipping nations, though not an outright majority holder of global capacity. According to BIMCO (the international shipping association) analysis in late 2023, Greek and Chinese shipowners together control about 34% of the world’s cargo ship capacity (in deadweight tonnage) (​rivieramm.com). Greek owners alone account for roughly 19% of global carrying capacity, the single largest national share, especially due to their dominance in tankers and bulk carriers (​rivieramm.com. Chinese shipowners have the second-largest share globally, on the order of 15% of worldwide tonnage capacity​rivieramm.com. In fact, BIMCO’s chief analyst noted that “Chinese shipowners now jointly control the world’s largest merchant fleet” by some measures, effectively tying with or slightly surpassing Greece in total numbers, although Greece remains #1 in capacity share (​rivieramm.com). This confirms the Chinese fleet is significant but on the order of one-sixth to one-fifth of global capacity, not an overwhelming majority. The Xinhua claim of “less than 19% of global market share” for China’s fleet is consistent with these independent figures. It appears China’s fleet is large but still under one-fifth of the global total, which aligns with expert assessments​ (rivieramm.com).

Container Shipping Firms

In the container liner segment (measured by TEU capacity), a Chinese carrier is among the top players but not the top. The world’s largest container shipping companies as of early 2025 are Mediterranean Shipping Co. (MSC) and A.P. Moller-Maersk, which together control roughly one-third of global container capacity (​en.wikipedia.org). China’s COSCO Shipping Lines (including its OOCL subsidiary) is the 4th-largest container line, operating about 3.35 million TEUs of capacity or roughly 10.6% of the world liner fleet​ (en.wikipedia.org). For context, MSC holds about 20% and Maersk 14%, while France’s CMA CGM has ~12.7%, just ahead of COSCO​en.wikipedia.org. The table below shows the ranking of major container carriers and their market shares, illustrating that COSCO (China) controls about a tenth of global container ship capacity:

^{Data source: en.wikipedia.org.}

This shows that Chinese firms (primarily COSCO) are major participants in container trade but do not “dominate” it outright – several Western and other Asian lines have comparable or larger shares. Notably, however, China’s state-owned COSCO has grown via mergers and enjoys government backing, contributing to U.S. concerns. Still, the global shipping market remains fragmented overall: outside the top 4 carriers, dozens of smaller lines split the rest of the capacity.

Cargo Volume and Operations

In terms of cargo throughput and logistics, Chinese companies have a huge presence in global trade. China is the world’s largest trading nation and its ships carry a significant volume of goods, including serving as the backbone of many supply chains. Chinese shipping firms (including COSCO and others) operate globally and call at ports worldwide. While exact percentages of cargo volume carried by Chinese firms are hard to pin down (since many ships owned by other nations also carry China–related cargo), China’s influence is substantial but not exclusive.

For instance, ocean shipping carries about 80% of global trade by volume (​reuters.com), and Chinese carriers are responsible for a sizable portion of that, though competitors like Maersk, MSC, etc., also carry Chinese exports. The Xinhua article’s figure of “<19%” likely referred to fleet share rather than trade volume share. The available data supports that Chinese ownership of shipping assets is on the order of 15%–18% globally (​rivieramm.com), meaning China controls a large but not majority stake in global shipping capacity.

It’s also important to note which sectors China truly dominates. China’s shipbuilding industry is a field where it does hold a dominant global position. By 2024, Chinese shipyards accounted for over half of the world’s new ship construction by tonnage.

For example, China produced about 55.7% of global shipbuilding output in 2024 (by tonnage)​ (globaltimes.cn), and reportedly captured around 70% of new vessel orders that year (​chosun.com). Additionally, China manufactures the vast majority of shipping containers (around 95%) and intermodal chassis (about 86%) used worldwide​(hoistmagazine.com / ​congress.gov).

These statistics (highlighted in the USTR’s investigation report) underscore that while China may not operate a majority of the world’s ships, it plays an outsized role in supplying the hardware of global trade – from the ships themselves to the containers and port cranes. This is part of what USTR characterized as China’s strategy to dominate key maritime supply chain sectors (​gcaptain.com). The Xinhua piece did not mention those particular stats, focusing instead on fleet ownership percentages.

In summary, Chinese shipping companies hold a significant but not controlling share of global shipping capacity. Independent data confirms China’s commercial fleet is sizeable (second in the world, roughly 15% of capacity)​(rivieramm.com), supporting Xinhua’s point that China’s share is well under 50%. In container shipping, a Chinese line has about 10% of the market​ (en.wikipedia.org). These figures suggest the term “dominance” is debatable: China is a top player, though the industry is still quite multinational. However, in related arenas like shipbuilding and equipment, China indeed has a dominant production share (​hoistmagazine.com) – context that likely informed the U.S. policy response.

3. International Organizations’ Views (IMO and WTO)

The Xinhua report intimated that U.S. actions were “protectionist, discriminatory and non-market”, sparking concern about disruption to the global trade order​ (english.news.cn). We looked for any official commentary from the International Maritime Organization (IMO) or World Trade Organization (WTO) regarding China’s role in shipping or reactions to these U.S. measures:

International Maritime Organization (IMO)

The IMO, as the United Nations agency responsible for maritime safety, security, and pollution standards, typically does not involve itself in trade disputes or market share issues. Its focus is regulatory (e.g. safety conventions, emissions rules) rather than commercial market dominance. Accordingly, we found no public statements from IMO about the U.S. fees or China’s market role in this context. It would be unusual for the IMO to comment on bilateral trade measures. That said, China is an influential member of IMO by virtue of its huge merchant fleet and shipbuilding industry. IMO’s annual maritime reports acknowledge China’s prominence – for instance, China has one of the largest fleets by gross tonnage and is a major flag state and port state. But on the specific question of U.S. protective fees, IMO has remained silent (as expected). The lack of IMO comment neither confirms nor contradicts Xinhua’s claims; it simply reflects that this issue falls outside IMO’s mandate.

World Trade Organization (WTO)

The WTO is the international body governing trade rules, and discriminatory port fees or restrictions could raise WTO compliance questions. As of April 2025, no formal WTO dispute ruling exists on this matter, but China has signaled possible action. The China Shipowners’ Association (CSA) publicly argued that the USTR’s proposed port fees violate WTO rules, calling them discriminatory​(reuters.com).

In a comment filed to USTR, the Chinese Shipowners cited WTO obligations and even a 2003 U.S.–China Maritime agreement, claiming the U.S. move breaches international trade law (​reuters.com). China’s government also reacted: the Chinese Foreign Ministry stated that the U.S. measures would not revive American shipbuilding and that China would take steps to “uphold its rights and interests”​ (reuters.com). This phrasing strongly implies China is considering a WTO challenge or other legal countermeasures. Indeed, industry observers noted that China could bring a case to the WTO arguing the fees unjustly discriminate against Chinese services/providers in violation of trade agreements. However, as of this report, we did not find record of a WTO case specifically on the port fees (which were only just finalized).

It’s worth noting that maritime transport services are partially covered by WTO rules (under the General Agreement on Trade in Services, GATS), but many countries have specific exclusions or have not fully committed shipping services to WTO disciplines. The U.S. fees target ships by their origin of build or operator nationality, which is an unusual trade restriction. A Reuters report quoted the Chinese Shipowners’ view that the U.S. action “violates international rules and U.S. laws”, explicitly saying it breaches WTO obligations and even the U.S. Administrative Procedure Act (​reuters.com​).

No official WTO spokesperson has weighed in publicly, which is typical unless a formal dispute is initiated. If a WTO legal analysis were done, it would likely examine whether the fees are a prohibited discrimination (similar to a tariff on services). For now, the WTO’s involvement is only potential – the credibility of Xinhua’s suggestion that the measures are protectionist is bolstered by the fact that global shipping associations and China’s representatives have condemned the fees on those grounds, possibly setting the stage for a WTO complaint​ (reuters.com).

In addition, international shipping bodies have voiced concern. The International Chamber of Shipping (ICS) and other global trade groups have reportedly warned that these U.S. fees could disrupt shipping lanes and set a harmful precedent. While not an intergovernmental body like IMO or WTO, such industry voices echo worries about trade fragmentation. For example, shipping experts fear a “domino effect” of higher costs and retaliatory measures, which aligns with Xinhua’s narrative of negative fallout​ (english.news.cn). Even some U.S. stakeholders (importers, port operators) opposed the initial fee proposal, citing supply chain chaos and billions in added costs for U.S. consumers if broadly applied​(reuters.com). The final USTR action tried to mitigate this with exemptions, as noted earlier, in response to those critiques.

Summary of International Reactions

The IMO has not taken a position on the U.S. steps, staying in its lane of technical regulation. The WTO angle remains hypothetical but very much in play – China has strongly hinted at defending its rights under WTO rules, and the legality of the U.S. fees could eventually be tested. The criticism of the U.S. measures as protectionist is supported by international commentary, though not (yet) by any formal ruling. Xinhua’s report reflects these global concerns by citing experts who label the fees a disruptive, unilateral move (​english.news.cn).

4. Credibility of the Xinhua Report’s Claims

Considering the above facts, we evaluate how well the Xinhua report’s claims hold up:

• Existence of U.S. Measures: Xinhua described U.S. “controversial measures” against China’s maritime/logistics sectors, including new “fees” on Chinese-built or operated vessels​ (english.news.cn). This is accurate. Official U.S. sources (USTR, Federal Register) indeed detail new fees aimed at Chinese ship operators and shipbuilders. The Xinhua piece correctly notes the policy was billed as “restoring America’s shipbuilding” by the U.S. side​(english.news.cn). There is ample confirmation of these fees and restrictions from U.S. government releases and reputable news agencies, so Xinhua’s description of the policy’s existence is credible.

• “Dominance” and Market Share: Xinhua questions the U.S. premise that China has a stranglehold or dominance in these sectors. It cites a Chinese expert saying China’s commercial fleet is <19% of the global total​(english.news.cn), implying that China is not dominant in world shipping. Our research confirms the Chinese share of global shipping capacity is on the order of 15–19%, second to Greece, and that no single nation dominates all of shipping (​rivieramm.com). Thus, it is true that China alone does not control a majority of the world’s merchant fleet.

• China’s leading role in shipbuilding and port infrastructure: The USTR’s claims of Chinese “dominance” were likely referring to broader influence: China’s leading role in shipbuilding, port infrastructure, and certain markets (containers, chassis, etc.). In those areas, China’s share is indeed very high (far above 50%) (hoistmagazine.com). The Xinhua report doesn’t mention those stats, focusing instead on the fleet percentage. So, while Xinhua is correct about the fleet share, it somewhat omits context: China does dominate shipbuilding (with over half of global output​ (globaltimes.cn) and essentially monopolizes container manufacturing​(hoistmagazine.com), which are part of the “maritime and logistics” sectors under discussion. The U.S. investigation specifically highlighted those points to justify action. Therefore, Xinhua’s implication that U.S. concerns are unfounded is only partially credible – it’s true that the decline of U.S. shipbuilding long predates China’s rise (a historical trend noted in the Xinhua piece via a professor citing U.S. CRS reports) (english.news.cn), but it’s also true that China’s state-driven strategy in recent decades has given it a commanding lead in many aspects of maritime commerce.

• Protectionism and Impact on Global Trade: Xinhua casts the U.S. fees as a protectionist move that could “further disrupt” global trade order and harm supply chains​ (english.news.cn). This viewpoint is widely shared by industry experts outside of Chinese media. As mentioned, the global shipping community (shipowners, carriers, even U.S. shippers) expressed serious concerns that the fees would raise costs and cause logistics complications​(reuters.com). Estimates circulated that the initial proposal could cost U.S. American importers $30 billion a year in higher fees passed on, and double export shipping costs for U.S. farmers (​reuters.com). While the final plan was watered down to address some of these issues, it remains a novel form of trade restriction in shipping. It is reasonable to expect some negative ripple effects (e.g. carriers rerouting to avoid fees, potential retaliation, higher costs on U.S. import/export). Xinhua’s warning of a “negative domino effect” (​english.news.cn) aligns with analyses by neutral observers (for example, logisticians noted that forcing carriers to reshuffle ships could cause port congestion or longer wait times)​ (gcaptain.com​gcaptain.com). Thus, the concern about disruption is credible, though the actual scale will depend on implementation and responses in the coming years.

• Reactions of International Bodies: The report implies a global consensus that the U.S. move is unreasonable. We did find that Chinese industry groups and officials strongly oppose the measures, labeling them discriminatory and vowing to fight back (potentially via WTO) (​reuters.com). However, it does not appear that any neutral international organization (IMO, WTO, etc.) has officially weighed in endorsing China’s position at this stage. Any WTO judgment on legality would take time and is not yet rendered. In that sense, the Xinhua narrative is mostly reflecting the Chinese viewpoint and those of experts sympathetic to it, rather than an established international legal verdict. Still, the lack of support for the U.S. action from other countries so far (no allies openly praised the fees) suggests the claim of “stoking concern” is fair. Global trade bodies typically discourage unilateral measures that upset established trade practices, so the U.S. stands somewhat isolated in this approach.

Conclusion

The Xinhua report’s core factual claims – that the U.S. imposed new fees on Chinese-built/operated ships, and that China’s share of the global fleet is under 20% – are substantiated by official sources and data. USTR documents and press releases clearly confirm the policy, and industry data supports the fleet statistics cited by Xinhua​ (rivieramm.com). The report’s characterization of the U.S. actions as protectionist and potentially harmful to global trade is an opinion, but one that is backed up by many industry experts and even some U.S. stakeholders (​reuters.com). On the other hand, Xinhua selectively omits China’s dominance in related domains (like shipbuilding output), which the U.S. had pointed to as a rationale.

Sources

1. Economic Watch: Port fees targeting Chinese ships will do U.S. no good – Chinese new agency Xinhua.

2. USTR Press Release:  “Section 301 Action on China’s Targeting of the Maritime, Logistics, and Shipbuilding Sectors for Dominance”, April 17, 2025. (Details of new phased fees on Chinese-built or operated vessels.)

3. Reuters – “United States eases port fees on China-built ships after industry backlash”, April 18, 2025 – reuters.com (Fee amounts and industry reaction; exemptions for certain trade routes.)

4. Reuters – “China shipowners group says US port fee proposal breaks WTO rules, US law”, March 13, 2025​reuters.com. (Chinese Shipowners’ Association statement calling the fees WTO-inconsistent and harmful to U.S. consumers.)

5. BIMCO/Riviera Maritime – “Greek and Chinese companies own 34% of global shipping fleet’s cargo capacity”, Nov 13, 2023​ – rivieramm.com​. (Statistics on global fleet ownership by country; Greek 19%, Chinese ~15% of DWT capacity.)

6. Alphaliner (via Wikipedia) – List of largest container shipping companies (March 2025) – ​en.wikipedia.org. (Container fleet sizes and market share; COSCO ~10.6% share of world container capacity.)

7. USTR Section 301 Report Findings (via Hoist Magazine) – Trump admin proposes tariffs on Chinese cranes – ​hoistmagazine.com. (China produces ~95% of world’s shipping containers and 86% of intermodal chassis, per USTR investigation report.)

8. Global Times (citing China’s Ministry of Industry) – China leads in shipbuilding 2024​ – globaltimes.cn. (China’s shipbuilding completions were ~55.7% of global output in 2024, reflecting its dominance in ship construction.)

E-Summary by ChatGPT, prompted by Insight EU