The Sino-Russian Nexus also rises in the Arctic. Cooperation will be shaped by resources, trade and security artifice of Arctic politics.
The Russian Federation has always maintained a stronghold in Arctic politics due to its vast geography, relatively large population in the region amongst the littoral states, longest coastline and powerful stature in world affairs. However, many other states also have geographical connections and historical, geological and even overlapping claims. The melting Arctic connects North America, Asia, and Europe creating new sea routes. The region contains 30 percent of the gas and 16 percent of total oil resources on the planet. The presence of natural resources makes the Arctic a new geopolitical hotspot with the increase in global energy demands.1)
The pace of melting ice in the Arctic has created a lot of opportunities in the past few decades. The World Economic Forum indicates that Arctic sea ice is melting beyond the rates predicted by the climate change models.2) The Arctic’s main governing body, the Arctic Council, is composed of 8 Arctic littoral states, 6 working groups, 6 permanent participants, and 38 member states. The governance of the Arctic has long been carried out by permanent members of the Arctic Council having coastlines with the Arctic Ocean. The entry of China into the Arctic Council with observer status has shifted many dynamics in the region.
The recent invasion of Ukraine has resulted in worsening prospects for the Russian economy in the wake of a multitude of economic sanctions imposed by the US and the EU. The Kingdom of Denmark, Canada, Iceland, Finland, Sweden, Norway, and the US have issued a joint statement against the Russian aggression in Ukraine calling it a grave impediment to cooperation in the Arctic as well.3) They have refused to attend the meetings under the chairmanship of Russia and have paused the participation in the Arctic Council and the subsidiary bodies. This move greatly isolates Russia in the region.
Meanwhile, China is trying to find ways to reduce the length of its trade routes and avoid the disputed passageways like the Strait of Malacca whilst maintaining energy sufficiency. The economic sanctions by the Western states are prompting Russia to enhance its ties with the People’s Republic of China. The establishment of the Northern Sea Route from the Bering Strait to the Barents Sea can be a win-win situation for both Russia and China, as it will produce revenues for Russia and save resources for China. Besides that, it can also serve strategic purposes amid the Sino-US and Russo-US rivalries.
The nature and direction of Sino-Russian cooperation has evidently diversified in recent times. Since 2013, Xi Jinping and Vladmir Putin have met more than 30 times.4) Xi called Putin his ‘best and bosom friend.’ Despite the Western pressure after the invasion of Ukraine by Russia, China cared less about the reputational damage and reassured that the bilateral relations would continue unhindered. China aspired to deepen the strategic relations with Russia in the middle of the war projecting its wolf warrior diplomacy and disregard towards the western concerns.5) The Sino-Russian alliance would be highly detrimental for the Western interests, but the scope and depth of partnership also matters greatly.
The Polar Silk Road and the governance of the Arctic
The Polar Silk Road is a part of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) that refers to the Northern part of the Maritime Silk Road (MSR). With the melting of the Arctic, the significance of this part of the MSR is increasing, as it can connect 3 major economic centers: North America, East Asia, and Western Europe, through the Arctic circle.6) Experts from the Arctic Circle Assembly noted that the Polar Silk Road will improve the overall economy of the circumpolar North. Global trade and shipping patterns are also likely to improve.
China issued its first ever white paper on the Arctic in 2018.7) In July 2018, the first Arctic-sourced liquified natural gas (LNG) was delivered to China. Russia and China have cooperated effectively on LNG projects since then. The Yamal Peninsula, inside the Arctic, is the site of the first ever Polar Silk Road cooperation between the two states. The project started operating in 2017 and the first energy shipment was made in 2018 to China. It was preceded by a contract signed between Novatkek and CNPC for the sale of a 20 percent stake in LNG. It included a supply of at least 3 million tonnes of LNG to China per year.8) CNPC’s stakes further rose to 29.9 percent when China through the Silk Road Fund bought another 9.9 percent share in the project.9)
LNG projects are the cornerstone of Sino-Russian cooperation in the Arctic. In 2021, China’s communication construction company won a contract to construct another terminal of LNG in the Kamchatka Peninsula in Russia. It fostered energy shipments from Russia to Asia. The initial Polar Silk Road will concentrate on the Northern Sea Passage which will reduce shipping cost and time. Russia now has a major emphasis on the infrastructural development of the Arctic region and it is a promising opportunity for China.10) The Russian Federation is incentivizing businesses and individuals to settle in the Arctic to enhance economic growth in the region. This will hugely benefit the Chinese Polar Silk Road.
China has a history in the Arctic region dating back to 1925 when the Svalbard Treaty was signed. Its interests in the region have roots in the 1980s, when China started exploration of both the Arctic and Antarctic. In 1993, China bought the icebreaker MV Xue Long from Ukraine which has been on several expeditions since then. In 1996, China became a member of the Arctic Science Committee. China is doing extensive research in the Arctic through projects like the Polar Research Institute within China that oversees the monitoring of ice, glaciers, and the atmosphere. In 2003, China inaugurated the Yellow River Scientific Research Station in Svalbard. In 2013, China got observer status in the Arctic Council. The same year, Iceland and China collaborated to form China-Nordic Arctic Research Center.11) China implemented the Polar Action Plan under the international polar year. China holds membership in the Asian Forum on Polar Science. In 2019, China launched MV Xue Long 2.12)
Currently, China is projecting its image as a concerned great power towards climate change and the non-traditional security issues. It is the first developing country to enact the National Action Plan on Climate Change. China held dialogues with all of the Arctic states. In 2008, it held talks with Canada and in 2009 and 2010 it held talks with Norway. It had a series of discussions with the US in March 2010, May 2011, and May 2012 over the laws of the sea and polar issues.
A scramble for the Arctic?
Similarly, almost all the Arctic states, by extending their claims over continental shelves, try to get better opportunities for strategic and economic interests. By 2013, within 10 years of signing the UNCLOS, Canada had claimed the Lomonosov Ridge, the underwater mountain range that cuts the Arctic into half. Russia also has claims over the ridge. In 2014, Denmark along with Greenland submitted a claim for an area of further 895000 square kilometers beyond Greenland past the North pole to the outer limit of the Russian Exclusive Economic Zone.13)It causes an overlap with Russia, US and Canada as well.14) Denmark also has claims over the Lomonosov Ridge which it considers a geological extension of Greenland.15) Russia had territorial issues with Norway too when it extended its continental shelf to include the area of the Barents Sea, the Arctic Ocean, and the Norwegian Sea. Norway and Russia signed the Barents Sea Treaty in 2010 on delimiting the maritime boundary in the Arctic Ocean and Barents Sea.16) Russia has ratified the UNCLOS and has submitted applications for claims over the Lomonosov and Mendeleev ridges. In 2016, it extended the claim to include the Chukchi high plain.
Under such dynamics, the scramble for the Arctic might seem a reality in the near future. Meanwhile, the number of actors is rising like the Chinese claiming to be a near-Arctic state. India pointed out the “intricate link between conditions in the Arctic and the monsoon and Himalayan systems” to bring forth its interests in the resource rich Arctic region.17) The UK and Iceland also urge NATO to flex its muscles in the Arctic. Besides that, under the Biden administration the ‘Don Young Arctic Warrior Act’ was passed to alleviate the issues of the US military in Alaska.18) The Act was an indication that the US had increasing focus on the military operating in the Arctic even if it was not for modernization of weaponry. In 2021, the US sent Four airbombers and 200 personnel from Dyess Air Force in Texas to the Orland Air Station in Norway, which is within 350 miles of the Arctic Circle. This was considered as a message to the increasing Russian militarization by many.19) Denmark has increased its defense expenditure by 245 million dollars to improve its surveillance capabilities in Greenland as the melting ice has increased its vulnerabilities.20) Another US ally, Canada rejected a bid by the Chinese state-owned Shandong Gold for TMAC resources in the Arctic for gold mining.21) The decision was taken on the basis of national security concerns. The relations between China and Canada have however exacerbated.22)
Drivers of Sino-Russian relations in the Arctic
Russia declares that it wants to safeguard the Arctic as a zone of peace and cooperation. Furthermore, it aims to use the Northern Sea Route as a national integrated transport system. Lastly, the share of oil and gas in the Russian economy currently stands at 38.9 percent.23) These resources are now shrinking, especially in Siberia. It is imperative for the Russian Federation to look for alternative means of energy production.
On the other hand, the US and EU sanctioned the transfer of technology and equipment to Russia for drilling below 150 to 152 meters. They also sanction the exploration of the Arctic shelf shale oil reserves. Such bans caused Eastern companies like Exxon Mobil, State Oil, and others to suspend their cooperation with Russia in the Arctic. Sanctions were also placed on companies giving loans for periods longer than 30 days. The largest Russian corporations and banks like Rosneft, Transneft, Novatek, Gazprom, Gazpromneft, Surgutneftegaz, and Lukoil remain under sanctions. Such policies have made it difficult to seek financing for Arctic projects, especially in Western markets.24)
For China, Russia is the biggest “Gatekeeper of the Arctic” and a necessary partner. With growing energy demands, China sees the Russian Far East, Siberia, and Russian Arctic as sources of energy resources, export markets, trading routes, and recipients and partners on infrastructure and other developmental projects. The Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavov called China the priority partner to Russia in the Arctic by which he meant the Russian Arctic only.25) China is now seeking more managerial positions within the Arctic. It has stressed on the governance of the Arctic and reciprocity. It has reiterated the need for adherence to the UNCLOS and the accessibility of free seas to all in the 2018 White Paper.
Russian militarization in the Arctic and the response of the US and its allies
In April 2021, the Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu said that Russia would continue the development of its military infrastructure in the Arctic and along the coast of the Arctic Ocean.26) Russia is involved in the militarization of the Arctic. It is placing hypersonic ballistic missiles that can threaten the US. The North Warning System of the US, established during the 1980s, has outdated technologies and is incapable of providing defense against modern cruise missiles and the advanced weaponry of Russia.27) In December 2019, Russia deployed Kinzhal,28) which is an air-launched hypersonic ballistic missile. Another test was an Tsirkon hypersonic cruise missile.29) Tsirkon will be joined by the Avanguard glide vehicles and the Kinzhal missiles capable of striking with an incredibly high speed. Putin considers these technologies ‘invincible’. Russia has air and naval bases in Wrangel Island, which is within 300 miles of Alaska. Russia claims to own missiles along with China that the US has cannot counter.30)
The response of the Western states toward Russian militarism in the Arctic is divided into two strands. First one are the apologists who deem the Russian actions as defensive, where US reciprocity can further aggravate the situation by creating a security dilemma. The securitization of the region can further antagonize Russia towards the US. They consider that the growing securitization is groundless as the threat itself is not imminent. Thus, any efforts to target Russia in pursuit of security can prove counterproductive.
On the other hand, alarmists point out that Moscow and Beijing are trying to outmaneuver the US deliberately. Russia is violating international treaties by using nuclear weapons in the Arctic. For instance, Russia was accused of testing low-yield nuclear weapons at Novaya Zemlya islands which it refused, however the apprehensions hovered over the US.31)
In the Russo-US Summit of 2021 held in Geneva, the Arctic was discussed. Putin, while commenting on the US concerns over Arctic militarization, called the US apprehensions “groundless”. He claimed that Russia was restoring the demolished infrastructure. He also claimed the development of nature conservation infrastructure and military and border control infrastructure in the Arctic. He affirmed that the role of Russia was nowhere close to that of the Cold War era. Russia pointed out that the Emergencies Ministries were being set up in the Arctic for rescue missions that would benefit all. Russia has over 40 powerful nuclear icebreakers in the Arctic while the US has just two, one of which has surpassed the age it was made for. Currently, the US has only one operational icebreaker, Polar Star.32) This probably prompted Biden’s statement “We need modern icebreakers, yes, but just as critically we need to stand shoulder to shoulder with those allies and partners that share our views including the indigenous communities.33)
Sino-Russian Partnership in the Arctic: the uniting factors
The energy demand of China is one of the major factors uniting the two states. After the invasion of Ukraine, Russia became the greatest exporter of crude oil to China. Currently, Russia is trying to compensate for the damage caused by the US and EU by focusing Eastwards.34) The increase in militarization of the Arctic by the US-backed NATO states like Denmark is a source of apprehension for both the Russian Federation and China. Russia considers it a direct threat, while China can be threatened indirectly due to strategic concerns and energy dependency related apprehensions. China wants to secure a strong base and influence within the Arctic projecting itself as a stakeholder. It is evident by its growing number of discussions and statements about Arctic-related issues.35)
The current scenario makes it imperative for Russia to have a strong partner. Western sanctions on Russia after the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the invasion of Ukraine would have been far more detrimental had China followed the US trajectory of economic relations with Russia. According to a report by The Atlantic, although the US was unable to completely reverse the Kremlin’s actions in Ukraine, it stunted the economic growth of Russia to a very low level. From 2014 to 2021, the average economic growth was 2.3% around the globe, but it was 0.3% for Russia.36) The Russian economy ministry expects the GDP to shrink by 7.8% in 2022 due to the western sanctions and the cost of war.37) Currently, China is Russia’s biggest trading partner. The leaders announced a ‘no-limits’ partnership, aiming to grow the bilateral trade to 250 billion dollars by 2024.38)
The Arctic is a subset of the greater Sino-Russian friendship. Besides cooperating on projects in the Yamal Peninsula, China is also the biggest investor in the Power of Siberian Pipeline, a 55 billion dollar project that is the largest gas project in the post-Soviet Russian history.39) The project came soon after the US and the EU imposed sanctions on Russia for the Crimean annexation. Still, China does not approve of the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
Nigel Gould-Davies, Senior Fellow for Russia and Eurasia at IISS, holds the view that Sino-Russian relations are at the “strongest, closest, and best” that the both countries have had since at least the 1950s and possibly ever. Sino-Russian joint ventures in forms of joint patrols in the Asia-Pacific region and events like the penetration of the Air Defense Zone of South Korea40) create common enemies, while further strengthening the Sino-Russian partnership.
The divisive factors in the Sino-US partnership in the Arctic
The likelihood of disengagement between China and Russia also exists. In 2007, Russia vehemently opposed Chinese membership in the Arctic Council.41) It is still wary about the growing independent position of China on Arctic-related issues. Free navigation of China in the Arctic might pose risks for Russia sometime in the future as the relations between these states have improved only recently. Kamila T.N. Sorenson & Ekaterina Klimenko point out that Russia has been reluctant to allow Chinese further dominance in the Arctic and both the states are unlikely to enter an explicit security agreement. They have not been strongly engaged in the areas other than Yamal Peninsula. The interests and approaches of the two states are not very consistent in the Arctic.42) Neither of these states is ready to work under the patronage of the other. Russia wants the governance of the Arctic to be maintained only by the littoral states, of which it is the largest, strongest, and most populous. The current status has benefited Russia in dominating Arctic affairs. However, the 2018 Arctic White Paper by the State Council rings alarm bells for those who feared greater involvement of China in the region. Yun Sun, the Co-Director of the East Asia Program, also points out that it was Russia that had the original idea of the Northern Sea Route. In the second Sino-Russian summit held in 2015, the Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin suggested the viability of NSR as the ‘most promising project’ to the Chinese Premier Wang Yang.43) Still, the Polar Silk Road appears to be a Chinese initiative, as it is very vocal about its aspirations in the Arctic.
Another divisive factor is the Chinese dislike towards sporadic decisions and projects taking longer time than planned. Only 4 out of 20 ports along the NSR in the Arctic are connected to the infrastructure of Russia.44) The Chinese experts consider the Russian infrastructure inefficient and outdated. They hold the view that Russia has not invested enough in the Arctic commensurate with its geopolitical significance. China is also critical of the lesser investment by Russia in the Arctic-related projects. China is also cognizant of the volatility of cooperation with Russia where in the very recent past, Russia was a steady opponent of BRI and even the Chinese research facilities in the Arctic. China is also skeptical of the failure of the Russian Federation to maintain transit traffic in the Arctic. Meanwhile, Russia is unable to make huge investments due to its economic conditions.
Conclusion
Sino-Russian collaboration rather than confrontation is the more likely phenomenon in the Arctic. The Sino-US rivalry and the poor relations between NATO and Russia make the peace between China and Russia imperative as both states cannot afford to fight on a new front. Russia lacks the economic potential to fully tap into its Arctic resources, while China is in pursuit of shorter trade routes and meeting its energy demands. The Sino-Russian cooperation on energy projects in the Arctic can be beneficial for their economies, as well as security concerns. Russia and China have shared years of adversarial relations, which made the securitization of their 4000 km long border expensive. Now, the prospects for cooperation between these states have improved. Still, China is concerned with the lack of investment by Russia in the projects for its own country. Russia is also cognizant of the dangers of unchecked Chinese access to the Arctic.45)
Maria Rehman is an undergraduate student of International Relations at National Defence University, Pakistan.
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